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ABSTRACT 
 
Current plans to invest over $1.7 trillion on U.S. infrastructure will result in rehabilitation of one-
fifth of the U.S. highway systems over the next ten years. Consequently, alternative project 
delivery and contracting strategies are seen as major interventions to address increasing pressure 
on project acceleration for minimizing public inconvenience due to extensive rehabilitation. 
Critics, however, highlight several impediments to project acceleration. First, the impact of 
project changes on project schedule and cost performance in terms of their occurrence timing is 
unknown. Second, the effectiveness of alternative contracting strategies on the aspect of project 
performance has not been fully evaluated. Lastly, the way project contingency plans are executed 
by state transportation agencies is ad-hoc, and has led to many misapplications that fail to mirror 
project risks into project planning and budgeting. 
To circumvent these challenges, this study aimed to develop models for quantifying the 
effects of alternative delivery method (design-build) and contracting strategies (A+B, no excuse 
bonus, incentive/disincentive, and lump sum) on project performance. Particular emphases were 
given to (1) quantification of change order occurrence timing impacts on project performance 
under the design-build delivery method; (2) development of performance models with 
consideration of the simultaneity in schedule and cost under alternative contracting strategies; 
and (3) establishment of a comprehensive contingency adjustment framework that considers the 
performance impacts of alternative contracting strategies. The research objectives were 
accomplished by analyzing the large real-world dataset consisted of 1,103 rehabilitation, 
reconstruction, and resurfacing (3R) projects that were completed between 2002 and 2011 in 
Florida.   
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For the first objective, the results from the t-test and multiple linear regression indicated 
that design-build was more effective in restraining schedule and cost growths than the traditional 
design-bid-build. With respect to the occurrence timing of change order, it influenced 
significantly on schedule but negligibly on cost of the project. Contrary to the previous findings, 
the later occurrence of change order caused less schedule delays. The second objective was 
obtained by conducting the three-stage least squares, which can reflect the simultaneity in 
schedule and cost. The analysis results provided significant evidences of not only the 
simultaneity existence between schedule and cost but also accuracy and efficiency improvements 
in model estimation. In regard to the performance impacts of alternative contracting strategies, 
A+B (cost-plus-time bidding) was the most undesirable on aspects of both schedule and cost. 
Meanwhile, no excuse bonus and incentive/disincentive were effective in constraining schedule 
growths. Although lump sum is considered to have low project risks, it showed high degree of 
cost overruns. Finally, this study developed a comprehensive contingency adjustment framework 
based on sequential impacts of factors on needs for contingency adjustment. The framework 
using the path analysis implied that projects with long duration, owner’s high initial estimate, 
lump sum contracting strategy, and a major contractor may need more contingency, while no 
excuse bonus contracting strategy and economic environments under recession may alleviate 
required contingency allocation. 
This study provides the quantitative insights into the performance impacts of alternative 
project delivery method and contracting strategies, and the first holistic view to anticipate project 
factors’ sequential impacts on contingency adjustment, which are applicable in project planning 
and budgeting. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background and Significance 
 
Transportation infrastructure plays a pivotal role in societal welfare and national economy. 
However, the current U.S. highway systems are significantly obsolete and damaged because 
most of them were built between the 1950s and 1980s and already exceeded their 20-25-year life 
span (Choi et al. 2015; Choi and Kwak 2012; Choi et al. 2011; Choi 2010; Choi et al. 2013; 
Napolitan and Zegras 2008). According to the U.S. Department of Transportation (2015), 65 
percent of major roads in the U.S. are in less than good condition and 24 percent of bridges need 
significant repair. However, the rehabilitation of these highly impaired road systems is a 
daunting task since it requires prohibitive costs: The American Society of Civil Engineering 
(ASCE) (2017) estimated future investment needs of $836 billion in total, which include $420 
billion in the renewal of existing roadways and $123 billion in bridge repair.  
In addition, the capacity of the current roadways also fails to meet drastically increasing 
traffic demands (Bae et al. 2017; Choi 2010; Lee et al. 2008; Napolitan and Zegras 2008). 
Vehicle miles traveled (VMT) drastically increased by 500 percent, from 600 billion to 3 trillion 
VMT, over the fifty years since the late 1950s, yet the addition of new roadways increased only 
by 15 percent during the same period (American Association of State Highway and 
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) 2007).  The ASCE (2017) declared that 40 percent of urban 
highways were congested and the corresponding traffic delays cost $160 billion in wasted time 
and fuel in 2014 alone. These infrastructure conditions threatening public convenience and 
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national economy have recently spurred the federal government to map out a plan that invests 
$1.7 trillion on improving the U.S. infrastructure (Fortune 2017; Reuters 2018). 
Besides the rehabilitation of the deteriorated transportation infrastructure, accelerating 
project delivery and relieving traffic congestion during construction have also become significant 
challenges in transportation improvement projects (Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 
2014). This is because repairing the transportation systems can also induce traffic delays, 
consequent public inconvenience, and economic losses (Choi and Bae 2015; Choi et al. 2016; 
Choi et al. 2013; Choi et al. 2013). The FHWA (2017) estimated that in 2014, delays due to road 
construction work zones accounted for 24 percent of highway congestion and 10 percent of the 
overall congestion, causing fuel loss of 310 million gallons. Furthermore, there were 669 
fatalities from crashes in road construction work zones in the same period, accounting for 2 
percent of all national roadway fatalities (FHWA 2017). To circumvent these challenges, state 
transportation agencies (STAs) have adopted alternative approaches for early project completion 
to (1) reduce project delivery duration, (2) minimize inconvenience to road users and 
surrounding communities, and (3) restrain unfavorable economic impacts of road construction 
work zones. 
STAs recognized that the traditional project delivery methods and the conventional 
contracting strategy have limitations in fast-tracking project delivery with the completion of 
projects within budget and timeline. As a solution, many STAs have pursued alternative delivery 
methods and contracting strategies. Design-bid-build (DBB) has been the most commonly used 
traditional delivery method over the last five decades (Ibbs et al. 2003; Ling et al. 2004; Shrestha 
et al. 2011; Sindhu et al. 2017). Since it employs linear sequences of design, bid, and 
construction, it is highly likely to have slow project delivery speed (Ibbs et al. 2003; Touran et al. 
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2009; Tran and Molenaar 2013; Tran and Molenaar 2015). As an alternative project delivery 
method, a Design-Build (DB) approach has become the preference of many STAs. It is believed 
to fast-track the project delivery by overlapping design and construction phases, and to improve 
communication among participants by services from a single design and construction entity 
(Borowiec et al. 2015; Gould and Joyce 2009; Hale et al. 2009; Ibbs et al. 2003).  
As an attempt to overcome the shortfalls of the conventional contracting strategy, the 
STAs have adopted alternative contracting strategies, including A+B (cost-plus-time bidding), 
incentive/disincentive (I/D), no excuse bonus (Bonus), lump sum, lane rental, warranty clauses, 
and liquidated savings (Choi and Lee 2008). The Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) 
defines these alternative contracting strategies as the followings (Ellis et al. 2007). In an A+B 
contracting, bidding consists of both prices and duration required to complete project and the 
contract is then awarded to the lowest A+B bidder. An I/D strategy encourages fast-tracking on a 
daily basis by providing incentive payments to the contractor for early completion and deducting 
disincentive amounts for late completion. No excuse bonus is a contracting strategy that awards 
monetary bonus when the contractor completes the project by a specified milestone date, a 
completion date, or both regardless of weather or unforeseen conditions. In a lump sum setting, 
the contractor tenders a single lump sum price instead of bid item prices.  
Although the use of alternative delivery method and contracting strategies has been 
increasing since the 1990s, the selection of the exact approach is frequently made on an ad hoc 
basis with little quantitative insight on its possible consequent impacts on project performance 
(Tran and Molenaar 2015). Accordingly, improved quantitative understandings about the 
effectiveness of alternative approaches would significantly assist STAs to make better decisions 
associated with delivery and contracting approach selection. Therefore, this research developed 
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models to estimate performance impacts of the alternative delivery method (DB) and contracting 
strategies (e.g., A+B, no excuse bonus, I/D, and lump sum). As a means to measure such 
effectiveness, this study mainly examined the impacts of change orders on project schedule and 
cost, which are a commonly used parameter in performance evaluation of the project. 
However, construction projects are inherently uncertain and involve the high level of 
risks. As a result, schedule delays and cost overruns are prevalent and inevitable. Owners 
allocate additional costs over project budget to absorb such fluctuations in project schedule and 
cost: that is, contingency. Of many definitions of contingency, according to the Association for 
the Advancement of Cost Engineering (2017), contingency is defined as: “An amount added to 
an estimate to allow for items, conditions, or events for which the state, occurrence, or effect is 
uncertain and that experience shows will likely results, in aggregate, in additional costs. 
Typically estimate using statistical analysis or judgment based on past asset or project 
experience.” Although contingency is intended to cope with project risks and corresponding cost 
changes, current contingency practice is neither accurate nor effective because STAs usually 
apply the traditional fixed rate over the project’s original contract amount frequently without 
consideration of project characteristics and consequent project risks. For instance, the FDOT 
(2017) applies the contingency policy of the fixed rate and amounts regardless of project 
attributes and risks. Consequently, their contingency policy has limitations in addressing actual 
cost variances of the project. To overcome the current contingency estimation issue, the 
improvement of contingency calculation methods has been of interest among practitioners and 
researchers. However, there still need further research efforts to advance contingency estimating. 
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1.2. Problem Statements 
 
When improving existing highway infrastructure systems, employing more efficient and 
effective project delivery methods and contracting strategies plays pivotal roles in achieving 
successful project completions (Goodrum et al. 2005; Ibbs et al. 2003; Molenaar and Yakowenko 
2007; Touran et al. 2009; Tran and Molenaar 2015). Therefore, improved understandings about 
alternative approaches will serve as essential baselines for better selection of delivery and 
contracting methods at given project conditions and goals. Acknowledging this importance, 
many researchers have made concerted efforts to investigate and quantify the effects of 
alternative approaches on aspects of project performance and change order impacts. A review of 
previous studies, however, revealed a number of limitations as follows: 
First, despite the growing use of alternative approaches, the research results regarding 
their effectiveness are incongruent. Although most past studies on project delivery methods 
concluded that DB outperforms the traditional DBB method, there exists conflicting findings. 
These conflicting results also exist in the research area of alternative contracting strategies. 
Moreover, it should be noted that most previous studies have focused largely on A+B and I/D 
provisions, while putting less or no emphasis on no excuse bonus, lump sum, and other 
alternative contracting strategies.  
Second, because changes are inevitable in any construction projects, numerous 
researchers have investigated the unfavorable impacts of change orders. No study, however, has 
examined how the timing of change order occurrence influences on project performance. 
Depending on the occurrence timing of a change order, its impacts on project performance may 
vary. For example, it is commonly believed that a change order in the late stage of the project 
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delivery may cause more negative impacts on performance than in the early stage. Moreover, 
change order frequency has not been included in the project performance assessment. Change 
order frequency itself can be a significant factor to project performance because it can represent 
the uncertainties and risks of the project. However, previous studies have focused mostly on 
uncovering reasons of change order frequency and measuring the level of frequency.  
Third, a change order can cause solely schedule or cost variances, or lead to both 
schedule delays and cost overruns, simultaneously. Some previous studies have pointed out that 
schedule and cost aspects of the project are cross-correlated (Anastasopoulos et al. 2010; 
Bhargava et al. 2010; Kerzner 2017; Rajan et al. 2013; Shenhar and Dvir 2007). However, most 
of past studies usually employed separate equational models for the impact quantification. 
Therefore, additional research is needed to take into account the interdependent relationship 
between schedule and cost. 
Fourth, many studies have analyzed relatively small quantity of construction data. 
Moreover, in many cases, the analysis has been performed without considering important 
confounding factors such as project work types. This might have caused biased analysis results. 
This kind of problem can be exemplified with the analysis without consideration of project types. 
New construction projects may have higher complexity and risks than renewal of the existing 
facilities. If the classification of project types (e.g., new versus renewal projects) are not 
considered in the analysis, it is not likely to fully reflect indigenous aspects of each project type. 
Therefore, it would be helpful to conduct the analysis with a large sample size and considering 
such confounding factors. 
Lastly, although there have been numerous attempts to advance contingency estimation 
methods, there still exist gaps in the existing practice and literature. In particular, no study has 
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developed a comprehensive contingency estimation framework that includes sequential impacts 
of factors through the lifecycle of the project under contracting strategies. Constriction activities 
can be categorized by their construction phases, such as planning, bidding and contract, 
construction, and completion. Each activity may be influenced by precedent activities or have 
impact on activities in the following phases. For instance, if an alternative contracting strategy is 
provided, bidding competition and pattern of contractors would be affected. Consequently, the 
project’s original amount would be influenced, and the aspects of change orders and consequent 
project performance would be also affected. Therefore, consideration on these sequential impacts 
of factors may be beneficial in the investigation of factor impacts on project performance. In 
addition, in the intended research area, new innovative contingency methods have been 
introduced and adopted, including Monte Carlo simulation, fuzzy set techniques, and artificial 
neural network (ANN) methods. Although they have been successful in deriving accurate and 
effective contingency allocation, the implementation of such methods usually requires significant 
cost and time to conduct (Bakhshi and Touran 2009; Bakhshi and Touran 2014; Smith and Bohn 
1999). Therefore, some of them would not be appropriate unless the project is large in scale and 
complicated. Moreover, some methods such as ANNs can barely represent the relationships 
among factors because they are largely s black-box method. Therefore, a comprehensive but 
point-and-shoot contingency estimation framework needs to be developed to better assist STAs, 
which is applicable to most of projects. 
To address the aforementioned research gaps and to improve STAs’ understandings about 
the effectiveness of alternative approaches, there is a pressing need to conduct additional 
research that focuses on: (1) investigating the effectiveness of alternative delivery method and 
contracting strategies, (2) developing models that quantify the effects of alternative approaches, 
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(3) assessing the impacts of change order occurrence timing and frequency on project 
performance, (4) developing models that reflect the simultaneity in project schedule and cost, (5) 
performing the analysis using real world construction data with a large sample and including 
consideration of project work types, and (6) creating a comprehensive but intuitive contingency 
calculation framework that reflects sequential impacts of factors through the construction phases. 
 
1.3. Research Objectives 
 
The primary goal of the current study is to develop models that quantify the impacts of 
alternative delivery method and contracting strategies on project schedule and cost. Particularly, 
based on the problem statements stated earlier, this research included the following three 
objectives and several sub-objectives:  
Objective 1: Investigate the impacts of change order magnitude and change order 
occurrence timing on project schedule and cost under a DB setting in roadway rehabilitation 
projects; 
1-1: Compare project schedule and cost performance of the DB method with the 
conventional DBB approach;  
1-2: Examine the aspects of change order magnitude and occurrence timing between DB 
and DBB; and 
1-3: Develop models that can quantify the likely impacts of change order magnitude and 
occurrence timing on project performance in DB highway renewal projects 
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Objective 2: Develop quantitative performance models for the effectiveness of 
contracting strategies with consideration of the simultaneous relationships between project 
schedule and cost under alternative contracting strategies in roadway renewal projects; 
2-1: Determine whether the use of alternative contracting strategies influenced on project 
schedule and cost by comparing with projects with alternative contracting strategies 
with those of the conventional contracting strategy;  
2-2: Examine the degree of change order magnitude and frequency among contracting 
strategies; and 
2-3: Establish quantitative models that can represent not only the performance impacts of 
alternative contracting strategies but also the cross-correlated impacts of project 
schedule and cost. 
Objective 3: Create a comprehensive contingency estimation framework that can reflect 
sequential impacts of factors through the lifecycle of the project with the consideration of the 
effectiveness of contracting strategies in roadway renewal projects; 
3-1: Examine sequential relationships among factors through project lifecycle from 
planning to completion stages 
3-2: Investigate the impacts of alternative contracting strategies on contingency 
adjustment needs as well as factors in succeeding stages 
3-3: Devise a contingency adjustment framework that can visually represent the lifecycle 
features of the project factors 
The first objective was established based on the idea that DB may have a tendency of 
earlier change order occurrence since it overlaps with procurement processes and starts the 
construction phase before the design completion. Therefore, it was expected to more explicitly 
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represent the timing impacts of change order occurrence on project performance. The second 
objective did not take the timing impact of individual change order occurrence into account since 
its primary purpose was to reflect the simultaneity in project schedule and cost under alternative 
contracting strategies. The third objective mainly focused on cost contingency. Despite the 
possible existence of the simultaneity in schedule and cost, the study did not include schedule 
contingency in the third phase. 
 
1.4. Research Methods 
 
To accomplish the aforementioned research objectives, the current research employed multiple 
quantitative research methods of post-hoc tests, t-test, Kruskal-Wallis test with Dunn’s test, 
multiple linear regression, three-stage least squares, and path analysis drawing on a large-
quantity dataset obtained from the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT). The following 
steps were undertaken in this research: (1) data classification, (2) descriptive and trend analysis, 
(3) comparative and post-hoc analysis, (4) variable identification, (5) statistical assumption 
check, (6) development of models, (7) interpretation and discussion of analysis results and 
findings. 
 
1.4.1. Research Area 
There has been a shift in the roadway projects from new construction to rehabilitation due to the 
significantly aged and damaged roadway systems (Choi 2017; Choi and Kwak 2012; Choi et al. 
2011; Herbsman et al. 1995). The initial dataset obtained from the FDOT comprised of 3,007 
roadway projects completed over the 10-year period between 2002 and 2011 in Florida. The 
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initial data classification procedure also affirmed that rehabilitation, reconstruction, and 
resurfacing (3R) projects were the dominant project work type: 32.7 and 36.5 percent in the 
project number and dollar amounts, respectively, as shown in Figure 3.3. To reflect this trend 
change and avoid biased analysis results, the study mainly focused on the 3R projects.  
 
1.4.2. Research Methods 
The research objectives were accomplished using quantitative analysis techniques. For the first 
research objective, the impact quantification of change order magnitude and occurrence timing in 
DB roadway renewal projects, a multiple linear regression approach was used. The second 
objective, the investigation of the simultaneity in schedule and cost performance under 
alternative contracting strategies, employed systemic equations that can take the existence of the 
simultaneity into account. In the third objective, path analysis was applied as a technique to 
develop a comprehensive contingency adjustment framework. As a basis for developing these 
three main models, this research also conducted a series of comparative and post-hoc tests: e.g., 
t-test, Kruskal-Wallis test, goodness of fit test, and other necessary statistical techniques. 
 
Phase I: Impacts of Change Order Occurrence Timing on Performance in DB Projects 
For quantifying the impacts of change order magnitude and occurrence timing on project 
cost and schedule in DB highway renewal projects, a multiple linear regression analysis was 
used. The research at this time establishes the following two respective equations for predicting 
the likely impacts of change order magnitude, occurrence timing and frequency on cost and 
schedule performance of the project; 
  𝑆𝑃𝑅 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽𝑠 ∙ 𝑋𝑠 +  𝛾𝑠 ∙ 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝛿𝑠 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅 + 𝜆𝑠 ∙ 𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝜎𝑠 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑅 +  𝜃𝑠 ∙ 𝐼 +  𝜀𝑠 (1) 
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  𝐶𝑃𝑅 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛽𝑐 ∙ 𝑋𝑐 +  𝛾𝑐 ∙ 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝛿𝑐 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅 + 𝜆𝑐 ∙ 𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝜎𝑐 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑅 +  𝜃𝑐 ∙ 𝐼 +  𝜀𝑐 (2) 
where, SPR and CPR = schedule and cost performance ratios, respectively; 𝑋𝑠 and 𝑋𝑐 = 
vectors of variables affecting project schedule and cost performance, respectively; TSCR and 
TCCR = total days and amounts change rate by total change orders of the project, respectively; 
SCR and CCR = days and amounts change rate by individual change order, respectively; Timing 
= occurrence timing of each change order;  and I = indicator variable for project delivery 
methods (1 if DB, 0 otherwise). 
 
Phase II: Simultaneity in Project Schedule and Cost under Alternative Contracting Strategies 
Change orders and other factors may be influential to both project schedule and cost, 
simultaneously. Therefore, this interdependency between schedule and cost should be taken into 
account in models, which quantify the probable effects of change orders and other factors on 
performance under alternative contracting strategies. To this end, this research initially set up the 
following equation system; 
  𝑆𝑃𝑅 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽𝑠 ∙ 𝑋𝑠 +  𝛾𝑠 ∙ 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝛿𝑠 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅 +  𝜃𝑠 ∙ 𝐼𝑖 +  𝜀𝑠 (3) 
  𝐶𝑃𝑅 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛽𝑐 ∙ 𝑋𝑐 +  𝛾𝑐 ∙ 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝛿𝑐 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅 +  𝜃𝑐 ∙ 𝐼𝑖 +  𝜀𝑐 (4) 
where, SPR and CPR = schedule and cost performance ratios, respectively; 𝑋𝑠 and 𝑋𝑐 = 
vectors of variables affecting project schedule and cost performance, respectively; TSCR and 
TCCR = the ratio of total change order days and amounts over original contract days and 
amounts, respectively; Ii = indicator variables for contracting strategies; and 𝜀s = error terms.  
Although the above two equations do not include direct interactions, they would have 
correlated error terms since cost overruns and schedule delays may be attributed to the same or 
similar project risks, also meaning that the same risks or changes may influence both cost 
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overruns and schedule delays of the project. Efficient parameter estimates of this equation 
system can be accomplished by considering the synchronical correlation of error terms. 
Therefore, this research applies the three-stage least squares (3SLS) method to account for the 
possible correlation between two dependent variables and to seek the efficiency in model 
estimation. 
 
Phase III: Integrated Contingency Adjustment Framework 
Based on the results in the phase II, the study developed a comprehensive contingency 
adjustment framework that implies factors’ impacts on contingency adjustment needs over the 
owner’s fixed rate contingency. Construction activities can be categorized into four stages in 
accordance with their sequences: namely, planning, bidding and contract, construction, and 
completion. In the completion phase, actual schedule and cost are determined. Subsequently, 
actual required contingency can be also confirmed in that stage. Based on this concept, the study 
initially set up the following path model, as shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Concept of Path Model for Contingency Adjustment 
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An appropriate analytical means to mirror pathwise causal relationships is path analysis, 
which can be consisted of two or more causal-effect regression models (Garson 2013). It can also 
provide an intuitive path diagram that represents complex causal and/or interrelated relationships 
of factors (Garson 2013; Hair et al. 2006; Kim et al. 2009; Yuan et al. 2018). Because this phase 
specifically aimed at suggesting a comprehensive but point-and-shoot framework, path analysis 
was used. 
 
1.5. Research Assumptions and Limitations 
 
The analysis in this research was conducted on a basis of the specific region, the state of Florida. 
The FDOT has 7 regional sectors and may have intrinsic practices differing among sectors and 
from other STAs. Hence, there may be some factors that influence on schedule and cost 
performance of the project, such as geographic and environmental conditions, procurement and 
management practices, temporal changes in the construction trend, and so forth. Nevertheless, 
considering the research intentions, this research assumed that the aforementioned aspects acted 
homogenously through all the projects and regional sectors. Additionally, the research presumed 
that the selection of project delivery methods and contracting strategies was made rationally by 
the agency. Although all the projects in the data were procured by the single agency, they were 
conducted in different sites and at different times. Therefore, the projects in the data are assumed 
to be independent. 
In these regards, this research has some limitations. First, the impacts of unobserved 
factors were not considered. Second, as the research mainly focused on roadway rehabilitation 
projects, other project types (i.e., new construction, bridge repair and construction, capacity 
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added, and others) are beyond the scope of this study. Finally, as alternative delivery method and 
alternative contracting strategies are usually applied to large-scale projects, the research excluded 
projects that have amounts and duration above or below specific bounds, to derive unbiased 
results. Therefore, the research results would not represent all rehabilitation projects. 
 
1.6. Research Significance 
 
The main contribution of this study is expected to be quantifying the likely effects of delivery 
methods and contracting strategies on project schedule and cost performance and developing a 
comprehensive contingency estimation framework. More specifically, it will develop schedule 
and cost models and integrated contingency adjustment framework to provide quantitative 
insights toward the effectiveness of an alternative project delivery method and alternative 
contracting strategies, and the impacts of other confounding factors. The estimated project 
variations derived from the models will, in turn, help practitioners in STAs to make a better 
informed decision in delivery method and contracting strategy selection and contingency 
allocation. Furthermore, the results and findings will serve as a basis for remedial measures to 
minimize the possible impacts on project schedule and cost growths, which are applicable during 
project planning, procurement, and construction phases. 
 
1.7. Dissertation Organization 
 
The primary objective of this study is to develop models that can quantify the effectiveness of 
alternative project delivery method and contracting strategies. Chapter 1 briefly introduced the 
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necessity of the study, the identified research problems and research objectives, and the 
corresponding research methods to accomplish the goals. In Chapter 2, the literature review 
pertinent to the themes of the study was discussed. The data and variables used in the study were 
explained with descriptive analysis results in Chapter 3. The study particularly aimed at 
achieving the following three research objectives: (1) quantification of change order occurrence 
timing impacts under two different project delivery methods (DB versus DBB); (2) development 
of performance models with the simultaneity in project schedule and cost under alternative 
contracting strategies; (3) establishment of a comprehensive but point-and-shoot contingency 
estimation framework that takes account of the effectiveness of alternative contracting strategies. 
Those three objectives and corresponding research questions were covered in Chapter 4, 5, and 
6, respectively. The last chapter summarized and concluded the overall research results and 
findings while discussing the contributions and significances of the study and the implications 
for future research. 
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As changes and consequent schedule delays and cost overruns are significant issues across the 
architecture, engineering, and construction (AEC) industry, there have been concerted efforts to 
investigate the reasons of changes and quantify their possible impacts on project cost and 
schedule. Moreover, alternative project delivery method and alternative contracting strategies, 
which have emerged to overcome the limitations of traditional approaches in fast-tracking the 
project delivery within planned budget and duration, have been at the center of research interests. 
A review of literature, however, shows significant gaps in transportation infrastructure research 
as follows: (1) incongruent results about the effectiveness of alternative approaches; (2) no 
quantification of change order occurrence timing impacts; (3) lack of study on the simultaneity in 
project schedule and cost under alternative contracting strategies; (4) lack of study analyzing a 
large-quantity dataset considering diverse project work types; (5) absence of a comprehensive 
contingency estimation framework that takes into account the effectiveness of alternative 
contracting strategies. This literature review is divided into six sections: project delivery 
methods, alternative contracting strategies, change order and their impacts, factors affecting 
project performance, simultaneity in project schedule and cost, and contingency practice and 
research. 
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2.1. Project Delivery Methods: Design-Bid-Build (DBB) and Design-Build (DB) 
  
DBB has been the most widely used traditional delivery method for public capital projects over 
the past five decades (Ibbs et al. 2003; Ling et al. 2004; Shrestha et al. 2011). Under a DBB 
setting, design and construction occur in a sequence of solicitation steps for each phase 
(Molenaar and Yakowenko 2007). Since bidding starts after the completion of design, and the 
owner enters into two separate contracts with an architecture/engineer (A/E) firm and 
construction company, it is likely to result in poor project quality due to the lack of 
communication between those two separate entities and slow project delivery speed by linear 
sequences of phases (Ibbs et al. 2003; Touran et al. 2009; Tran and Molenaar 2013; Tran and 
Molenaar 2015). 
To overcome the shortfalls of the traditional DBB approach, numerous STAs have 
increasingly used DB as an alternative project delivery method since the 1990s (Molenaar and 
Yakowenko 2007; Shrestha et al. 2011; Tran and Molenaar 2015). In contrast to DBB, the owner 
procures both design and construction services from a single entity under a DB delivery setting, 
benefiting from improved communication among stakeholders (Borowiec et al. 2015; Gould and 
Joyce 2009; Hale et al. 2009; Ibbs et al. 2003). Also, as depicted in Table 2.1, since DB overlaps 
two delivery stages of design and construction, projects with DB can reduce the duration of 
project delivery. Due to the decisive advantages, the number of states legislatively authorizing 
the use of DB in public projects increased from 3 states in 1993 to 42 states and the District of 
Columbia in 2016 and most DB-related bills focused on the transportation sector due to 
increased infrastructure priorities nationwide (Design-Build Institute of America 2017). 
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 Table 2.1. Structure and Procedure of Design-Bid-Build and Design-Build 
 
 Design-Bid-Build (DBB) Design-Build (DB) 
Structure 
  
 
Procurement 
Procedure 
 
 
 
 
From the perspective of the DB effectiveness, past studies on DB in the overall AEC 
industry, in general, found that DB outperformed DBB on aspects of project cost and schedule 
(Hale et al. 2009; Konchar and Sanvido 1998; Molenaar and Songer 1998; Songer et al. 1996). 
However, the findings in the highway projects have been incongruent. Ellis et al. (1991) 
concluded that DB led to 2 percent less cost overruns than DBB in several highway projects 
completed in Florida. A report published by the FHWA (2006) indicated that DB delivery 
reduced the overall project duration by 14 percent and the total cost by 3 percent on average 
while maintaining the same level of quality as compared to DBB delivery. Shrestha et al. (2007) 
analyzed 15 highway projects and found that DB decreased project cost by 6 percent while DBB 
showed 4 percent overruns. Conversely, subsequent research by Shrestha et al. (2011) showed 8 
percent cost overrun and 21 percent schedule delay in DB projects as opposed to 6 percent and 5 
percent in DBB. However, their findings were not statistically significant. Recently, Minchin et 
al. (2013) studied 51 highway and bridge projects completed between 2002 and 2011 in Florida 
and reported 40 percent cost overruns in DB and 20 percent in DBB. Yet, schedule delays in DB 
Owner 
Architect/ 
Engineer 
General 
Contractor 
     Subcontractors 
Owner 
Design 
Builder 
     Subcontractors 
Design 
Build 
Design Bid Build 
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and DBB were 20 percent and 23 percent, respectively. Moreover, Creedy et al. (2010) founded 
that there was no strong correlation between project delivery methods and cost growths. 
 
2.2. Alternative Contracting Strategies 
 
Akin to project delivery methods, alternative contracting strategies have emerged to tackle the 
limitations of the traditional contracting approach in fast-tracking the project delivery. As shown 
in Table 2.2, alternative contracting strategies include the followings: A+B, I/D, no excuse 
bonus, lump sum, lane rental, liquidated savings, and warranty clauses. Of these, A+B, I/D, no 
excuse bonus, and lump sum are the preference of many STAs and most previous studies have 
focused largely on A+B and I/D strategies.  
 
Table 2.2. Types of Alternative Contracting Strategies in Roadway Construction Projects 
 
Contracting Feature Best Suited 
A+B · Lowest combined bid for cost plus time Urban and bridge project with 
high traffic volume 
Incentive/ 
Disincentive 
· Incentive for early completion and penalty for late 
completion 
Urban and bridge project with 
high traffic volume 
No Excuse 
Bonus 
· Bonus for early completion within a specified time 
· No consideration of any issues and conditions 
including weather and accident 
Projects having importance in 
a specified timeframe  
Lump Sum · Lump sum price bidding instead of bid item price 
to reduce quantity overruns 
Projects with well-defined 
scope and low uncertainties 
Lane Rental  · Cost + (lane closure days × road user cost) Milling, resurfacing, bridge 
widening  
Liquidated 
Savings 
· Granting reward for early completion based on 
savings in construction engineering and inspection 
(CEI) and administration cost 
· Consideration of unforeseen events and conditions 
Milling, resurfacing  
Warranty 
Clauses 
· Guarantee of integrity of product and contractor’s 
responsibility of product defects 
· Incentive based on life-cycle cost 
Bridge painting, striping, 
asphalt pavement contracts 
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The A+B strategy is a cost-plus-time bidding that awards the lowest bidder based on a 
monetary combination of the bid amounts (“A” portion) and the time (“B” portion) for project 
completion, by multiplying the time by the estimated daily road user cost (El-Rayes 2001; 
Michigan Department of Transportation 2015; Shr et al. 2004; Shr and Chen 2003). This 
approach assists STAs to select a contractor who can shorten project duration, consequently 
minimizing the public inconvenience caused by road construction (Washington Department of 
Transportation 2016).  
The I/D technique provides the contractor monetary incentives for early completion and 
penalties for late completion to encourage accelerated construction (Choi and Kwak 2012; Choi 
2010; Ellis and Pyeon 2005; Goodrum et al. 2005; Jiang et al. 2010; Shr and Chen 2006; Shr et 
al. 2004). Under this strategy, STAs can reduce construction duration and contractors can earn 
more profits with incentive fees provided by the shorten duration (Choi 2010). This approach is, 
in general, applied to projects in heavily trafficked roads where primary goals are to achieve the 
early project completion and restrain public inconvenience (Christiansen 1987; Fick 2010; Ibarra 
et al. 2002; Jaraiedi et al. 1995; Rister and Wang 2004; Shr and Chen 2004).  
Similarly, the no excuse bonus method, which is also known as no excuse incentive, can 
reduce construction time by tying an incentive to the completion of the project and/or specific 
construction milestone activities by a set date (Ellis Jr et al. 2007; Florida Department of 
Transportation 2017; Michigan Department of Transportation 2015). However, since incentive 
amounts are substantial, there are no excuses for any issues or unforeseen conditions that may 
occur during the construction (Ellis Jr et al. 2007; Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 
2016; Michigan Department of Transportation 2015). This technique is applicable to projects 
that must be open to meet a critical date (Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 2016). 
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The lump sum bidding does not pursue the early completion of the project. Instead, it is 
designed to reduce possible quantity overruns and the contract administration related costs (Ellis 
et al. 2007; Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 2016). Bidders, in this setting, tender a 
single lump sum price instead of bid item prices, thereby allowing them to spend more time on 
inspection and less on paperwork (Ellis et al. 2007). This approach is used to projects with well-
defined project scope and low project uncertainties (Florida Department of Transportation 2001). 
Alternative contracting techniques, in general, can be utilized to minimize project 
implementation delays, accelerate construction, and shorten construction duration, consequently 
restraining work zone impacts of road construction projects (Choi and Kwak 2012; Choi et al. 
2011; Choi 2010; Choi et al. 2016; Sankar et al. 2006). However, their effectiveness is 
inconsistent across the past studies and little is known about their change order impacts on 
project cost and schedule (Choi and Kwak 2012; Choi et al. 2011; Choi et al. 2016; Herbsman 
and Glagola 1998).  
A number of studies have reported the promising results that alternative contracting 
strategies produced intended outcomes (Anderson and Russell 2001; Arditi et al. 1997; Ellis Jr et 
al. 2007; Jaraiedi et al. 1995; Scott et al. 2006). Anderson and Russell (2001) concluded that the 
provision of warranty clauses improved the quality of the facility after project completion. Scott 
et al. (2006) evaluated 77 A+B projects in 19 states and found that they were effective in 
schedule compression. Jaraiedi et al. (1995) and Arditi et al. (1997) reported that 93 percent of 
I/D projects were completed on time or ahead of schedule and drastically reduced construction 
duration by up to 50 percent. The FDOT’s summary on alternative contracting executive in 2007 
reported that the alternative contracting strategies were more beneficial than the conventional 
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approach in both project time and cost: namely, A+B, A+B with bonus, and Bonus contracting 
strategies were the most efficient in time savings (Ellis et al. 2007). 
However, there also have been contrary research results that the effectiveness of some 
alternative contracting strategies were ineffective or debatable when compared to the 
conventional contracting method or other strategies (Choi and Kwak 2012; Choi et al. 2011; 
Choi et al. 2016; Herbsman et al. 1995; Shen et al. 1999; Shr et al. 2004; Shr and Chen 2003; Shr 
and Chen 2004). For the effectiveness of A+B, Christiansen (1987) pointed out that A+B 
projects can be less effective as bidders may estimate inaccurate time or purposefully 
underestimate to win the bid. Choi et al. (2011) also found that A+B projects with I/D 
experienced more schedule delays. There also have been a number of studies that have raised 
questions about the effectiveness of I/D. The inaccurate project duration estimates of STAs could 
serve as a poor basis for incentive award, meaning that STAs’ duration overestimation could 
allow contractors to easily receive incentives without extra commitments (Choi et al. 2016; 
Herbsman et al. 1995; Rister and Wang 2004; Shr and Chen 2004). Recently, Choi et al. (2016) 
analyzed the effectiveness of pure A+B and I/D combined with A+B on aspects of the impacts of 
change orders using 1,372 highway projects in California and concluded that both approaches led 
to more schedule and cost changes than the conventional method.  
 
2.3. Change Order and Its Impacts on Performance 
 
A change order is an additional contractual document to accommodate any additional work 
beyond the original contract, which includes a modification of the original scope, cost, and/or 
schedule of the project (Anastasopoulos et al. 2010; Bhargava et al. 2010; Chen and Hsu 2007; 
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Choi et al. 2016; Hanna et al. 1999). Change orders can stem from many factors such as design 
errors, unforeseen site conditions, unrealistically low winning bid amounts, labor insufficiency, 
material and equipment related issues, political problems, disputes, and inclement weathers 
(Anastasopoulos et al. 2010; Rosenfeld 2013; Russell et al. 2014; Serag et al. 2010; Taylor et al. 
2012) . Construction projects are inherently uncertain, so change orders are inevitable and 
ubiquitous across the AEC industry. Change orders are known to be a main culprit of cost 
overruns, schedule delays and the reduction in labor productivity (Assaf and Al-Hejji 2006; 
Chester and Hendrickson 2005; Fayek et al. 2003; Fayek and Oduba 2005; Moselhi et al. 2005; 
Wichern 2004). 
 Accordingly, there have been past studies quantifying the change order impacts on 
project performance. To point a few, Al-Momani (2000) investigated causes of delays and 
conducted a simple linear regression analysis to estimate possible schedule delays. Hanna et al. 
(2002) performed a logistic regression to predict the influence of the change order on labor 
productivity in electrical and mechanical projects. In 2004, Hanna and Gunduz (2004) developed 
a model that estimates labor efficiency loss due to change orders in small projects. Moselhi et al. 
(2005) developed a neural network model to measure the impacts of change orders on labor 
productivity based on 33 Canada and USA projects. Serag et al. (2010) quantified the percentage 
increase in cost caused by change orders using regression models drawing on 16 FDOT projects. 
Choi et al. (2016) conducted a two-stage analysis to compare the effectiveness of accelerated 
contract provisions such as A+B and I/D with A+B with that of the conventional approach and to 
develop numerical models that predict the likely impact of change orders under accelerated 
contract provisions.  
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Through a review of the change order related literature, this research has identified that 
relatively few studies have focused on the timing impact of change order occurrence and most of 
them have concentrated mainly on labor productivity. Overall results showed that later changes 
had more negative impacts on labor productivity. Ibbs and Allen (1995) analyzed 104 projects 
from 35 different companies to test whether later changes are implemented less efficiently than 
earlier ones. Yet, they were not able to statistically support the hypothesis. A subsequent study 
by Hanna et al. (1999) used 61 projects from 13 mechanical contractors and included a weighted 
timing factor for change order timing int the formula. They concluded that change orders 
occurring late have more impacts on labor productivity than those occurring early in mechanical 
construction. Similarly to Ibbs and Allen (1995), however, they could not quantify the effect of 
change order timing. Chick (1999) concluded that later changes tend to have more impacts due to 
the limited time, large amount of material, and construction and crew interruption. Moselhi et al. 
(2005) developed a neural network model based on the analysis of 33 work packages in Canada 
and U.S. Their model included the build-up and rundown of labor hours normally spent to 
perform the work. Although the inclusion of the change order timing variable improved the 
estimation accuracy, the explicit impacts of change order timing was not discussed due to the 
black-box nature of the developed neural network model. Ibbs (2005) studied the impact of 
change order timing on labor productivity by categorizing projects into threefold; early (25 
percent of the projects that change order was considered fastest), normal (middle 50 percent), 
and late (slowest 25 percent). The regression analysis showed that earlier changes had less 
unfavorable impacts on labor productivity than later changes. Serag et al. (2010) analyzed 11 
variables collected from 16 Florida roadway projects to examine their impacts on cost overruns 
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due to change orders and concluded that late change order timing significantly increased the 
project costs. 
In regard to change order frequency, previous studies have largely focused on uncovering 
factors that influence on the frequency of change order. Rowland (1981) examined the causes, 
causality, and change order effects of projects in Georgia and indicated that the project 
complexity increased change orders and consequent cost and time overruns. Hester et al. (1991) 
studied the forms of dispute including the magnitude and frequency of change orders in 
insulation works in Texas and concluded that the impacts of change order were significant in 
project cost. Bordat et al. (2004) focused on the bidding-related factors affecting change order 
frequency in highway construction projects in Indiana. They reported that the major factors of 
schedule and cost growths and change orders were contract amount, difference winning bid 
amounts and second bid amounts, and difference between winning bid amounts and owner’s 
estimate. Recently, Anastasopoulos et al. (2010) analyzed the influence of project type, contract 
type, project duration, and size on change order frequency by applying a count-data model with 
five year contract data of Indiana highway projects. Their findings implied that the projects with 
larger amounts and longer durations encountered fewer change orders.  
 
2.4. Factors Affecting Project Performance 
 
Considerable amounts of past studies have evaluated project cost and schedule with many factors 
affecting project performance. On the basis of those past studies, it has been identified that the 
major causes of cost overruns and schedule delays are associated with poor design and estimates, 
inadequate management, project type, size, duration, complexity, level of bidding competition, 
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site circumstances, weather, and so on (Anastasopoulos et al. 2010; Anastasopoulos et al. 2010; 
Baccarini 2004; Baccarini 2006; Borowiec et al. 2015; Choi et al. 2004; Choi and Bae 2015; 
Choi et al. 2015; Choi and Lee 2016; Choi et al. 2015; Choi 2015; Choi et al. 2013; Choi et al. 
2013; Flyvbjerg et al. 2002; Flyvbjerg et al. 2003; Flyvbjerg et al. 2004; Forcada et al. 2017; 
Gransberg and Shane 2010; Günhan and Arditi 2007).  
Akinci and Fischer (1998) reported that risk factors associated with cost performance 
were the project design, construction, and project environment. Hinze et al. (1992) analyzed cost 
overruns in Washington State highway projects and concluded that the cost overruns increased 
by project size. Rowland (1981) concluded that cost overruns were derived from contract size, 
complexity, length of communication channels, and distortion of information associated with 
larger projects. Similarly, Jahren and Ashe (1990) found that larger projects had 1 to 11% more 
cost overrun rate than smaller projects and the winning amount less than the agency’s estimate 
also caused higher cost overrun rate. Chang (2002) analyzed the reasons for cost and time 
growths in engineering design projects and reported important factors such as work scope 
increase, legislation or standards changes, and archeological discoveries. Gkritza and Labi 
(2008) concluded that larger and longer projects were more prone to cost overruns. Flyvbjerg et 
al. (2004) determined that cost growth was affected by the implementation phase length and 
project type. From the perspective of schedule delays, Chan and Kumaraswamy (1997) 
conducted a survey in Hong Kong and found the main reasons of delays to be poor site 
management, poor supervision, unexpected ground conditions, and owner-initiated changes. Al-
Momani (2000) reported that the major causes of schedule delays were related to designers, 
weather, economic conditions, site conditions, and quantity increase. Shrestha et al. (2013) 
conducted an ANOVA test on 363 public works and found that large, long-duration projects had 
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more schedule overruns than small, short-duration projects. In 2005, Williams (2005) developed 
regression and neural network models for predicting highway project costs using bidding 
information, such as ratios of second lowest bid, mean bid, and max bid to the low bid. Of those 
factors, low bid, and low bid and second lowest bid were only significant in his regression model 
and neural network model, respectively. However, the study conducted by Baccarini (2004) 
reported that there were no significant correlations between cost variances and bid-related 
factors, such as date of bid, number of bidders, and mean value of bids. Creedy et al. (2010) 
identified risk factors causing cost overruns and concluded that design and scope changes are the 
most contributing factors to cost growths. 
 
2.5. Simultaneity in Project Schedule and Cost 
 
Because schedule delays and cost overruns are prevalent across the AEC industry, there have 
been a considerable number of studies investigating causes of schedule delays and cost overruns, 
and quantifying their consequences on schedule and cost performance of the project. However, a 
majority of studies have been mainly rooted in the approach that schedule delays and cost 
overruns are separate events (Bhargava et al. 2010). Subsequently, most of the previous studies 
largely have employed individual models for project schedule and/or cost.  Such an approach 
would be still meaningful in providing quantitative insights into factors’ performance impacts. 
However, since project schedule and cost variances are affected by similar attributes, there may 
be interdependent, or simultaneous, relationships between project schedule and cost (Bhargava et 
al. 2010; Bordat et al. 2004; Chan and Kumaraswamy 1997; Chang 2002; Choi and Kwak 2012; 
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Flyvbjerg et al. 2003; Flyvbjerg et al. 2004; Jahren and Ashe 1990; Williams 2005; Zheng and 
Ng 2005). 
Although simultaneity in multiple aspects is widely and commonly considered in model 
development across various research domains, it has rarely been applied in the research area of 
project performance, especially, in transportation infrastructure construction projects 
(Anastasopoulos et al. 2010; Bhargava et al. 2010; Lin 2005). The first attempt to take into 
account the simultaneity in schedule and cost of roadway projects was implemented by Bhargava 
et al. (2010). Based on cognizance of simultaneity existence in schedule and cost, they employed 
the ordinary least squares as well as the three-stage least squares (3SLS) methods to identify 
factors affecting schedule delays and cost overruns under different project work types (Bhargava 
et al. 2010). Their estimated models drew on 1,862 roadway projects and affirmed that 
simultaneity in schedule and cost exists and 3SLS is more effective and accurate than OLS. 
Subsequent research conducted by Anastasopoulos et al. (2010) also supported the effectiveness 
of 3SLS in estimation efficiency and accuracy. They developed a 3SLS based framework for the 
appropriate contract type selection in a highway maintenance and rehabilitation project by 
analyzing 487 highway contracts let between 1997 and 2007 across the globe (Anastasopoulos et 
al. 2010). Rajan et al. (2013) also demonstrated the significance and applicability of the 3SLS 
method in effective and accurate model estimation. They investigated performance impacts of 
public private partnership projects in India. Their 3SLS results helped to circumvent the 
simultaneity bias in schedule and cost and yielded statistically significant results.  
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2.6. Contingency Practice and Research  
 
The issue of cost growths in the construction industry is prevalent and inevitable across the 
globe, due to the inherently uncertain nature of construction projects. This phenomenon is even 
more frequent and severe in the area of transportation infrastructure construction (Creedy et al. 
2010; Molenaar 2005). To take an example, approximately 50 percent of large transportation 
projects in the U.S. experienced cost overruns (Sinnette 2004). For the severity of cost growths, 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) pointed out that transportation infrastructure projects in the U.S. had an 
average of 28 percent overruns over the past seven decades. However, in practice, contingency is 
determined on the basis of STAs’ predetermined fixed rates and/or expert judgment (Bakhshi 
and Touran 2014). The contingency percent under the traditional approach ranges from 5 to 10 
percent of the project original contract amount (Federal Highway Administration 2007). On a 
more serious note, consideration of project conditions and risks is often ignored under the 
traditional fixed rate method (Bakhshi and Touran 2014). 
As a response to the inaccuracy and ineffectiveness in contingency practice, there have 
been a considerable amount of studies aiming at improving contingency estimation methods. As 
alternative contingency calculation approaches, probabilistic and modern mathematical methods 
have been introduced (Bakhshi and Touran 2014). Contrary to the traditional deterministic fixed 
rate approach, probabilistic methods reflect project uncertainties based on pertinent statistical 
distributions, thereby revealing the probabilistic nature of contingency estimating (Touran 2006). 
Probabilistic methods include program evaluation and review technique (PERT), parametric 
estimating, regression, analytical hierarchy process (AHP), and Monte Carlo simulation (Bakhshi 
and Touran 2009; Dey et al. 1994; Humphries 2009; Isidore and Back 2002; Kim and Ellis Jr 
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2006; Moselhi 1997; Moselhi and Dimitrov 1993; Roberds and McGrath 2006; Touran 1993; 
Touran and Bakhshi 2010; Yeo 1990). Recently, emerging modern mathematical techniques 
such as fuzzy techniques and artificial neural network have been also adopted in the research 
terrain of contingency estimating. Fuzzy techniques are based on a fuzzy set theory for modeling 
intrinsic vagueness in the human cognitive process (Chan et al. 2009). To this end, they have an 
advantage in capturing and assessing risks under the circumstances that no statistical data are 
available and, consequently, qualitative information such as expert opinions is important (Sachs 
and Tiong 2009). Pertinent past studies have supported that the use of fuzzy sets and logics is 
effective in the risk assessment and contingency estimation of construction projects (Bakhshi and 
Touran 2014; Chan et al. 2009; Choi et al. 2004; Paek et al. 1993; Sachs and Tiong 2009). 
Another modern mathematical method that has gained in popularity is an artificial neural 
network (ANN). ANN can provide predictive solutions through processes of learning from 
training samples and detecting hidden relationships among data, and it is very effective in 
modeling complex non-linear relationships (Kulkarni et al. 2017; Schmidhuber 2015; Sommer et 
al. 2015). Due to these distinctive advantages, there have been notable previous studies that 
employed ANN in risk assessment and contingency prediction (Baccarini 2006; Bakhshi and 
Touran 2014; Chen and Hartman 2000; Touran and Lopez 2006).  
However, probabilistic and modern mathematical approaches have limitations. They, in 
large, require significant expense and time to conduct, and are likely not suitable unless the 
project is huge-scaled and complex (Bakhshi and Touran 2009; Bakhshi and Touran 2014; Smith 
and Bohn 1999). Moreover, ANN techniques are black-box methods in principle, so it is difficult 
to provide and explain the relationships between inputs and outputs (Kim et al. 2004; Kulkarni et 
al. 2017). 
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2.7. Chapter Summary 
 
The previous literature provided noteworthy implications about current practice and research on 
the effects of alternative project delivery method and contracting strategies on project schedule 
and cost. Particularly, the literature review highlights needs for further research on (1) 
quantification of change order magnitude and occurrence timing impacts under DB and DBB 
project delivery methods; (2) development of performance models that consider the simultaneity 
in project schedule and cost under alternative contracting strategies; and (3) establishment of a 
comprehensive but point-and-shoot contingency estimation framework that takes the 
effectiveness of alternative contracting strategies into account. 
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3. DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
The study primarily aimed at developing models that can quantify the performance impacts of 
change order under alternative project delivery method and contracting strategies and devise a 
corresponding contingency adjustment framework. To this end, the study collected and analyzed 
data for 3,007 roadway construction projects completed between 2002 and 2011 in Florida. This 
chapter discussed the natures of the data, variables used in the analysis, and initial descriptive 
analysis results.  
 
 
3.1. Research Data and Scope 
 
The primary source of the data was the FDOT. The data are comprised of 3,007 roadway projects 
completed over the 10-year period between 2002 and 2011 in Florida, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
The dataset includes various project attributes such as project work types, project delivery 
methods, contracting strategies, original contract amounts and duration, actual amounts and 
duration, and detailed change order information and bidding and letting information, as shown in 
Figure 3.2. Therefore, the data classification process is essential to avoid biased analysis results. 
For example, new construction projects would involve higher uncertainties when compared to 
the rehabilitation of existing facilities. Through the initial classification, the distribution of 
project work types was firstly identified. As shown in Figure 3.3, of various project types, 3R 
projects had the highest proportion, accounting for 32.7 percent and 36.5 percent in number of 
projects and budget allotments, respectively. During the two decades, the trend of the 
transportation infrastructure improvement projects has shifted from new construction to 
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rehabilitation to cope with the significantly aged and damaged roadway systems (Choi and Kwak 
2012; Choi et al. 2011; Herbsman et al. 1995). The FDOT also proclaims that their primary 
mission is to maintain and rehabilitate the existing roadway systems rather than to build new 
roads (FDOT 2007). Given this recent trend of change in roadway construction projects, this 
study focused mainly on 3R projects. It should be noted that DB and alternative contracting 
strategies are generally adopted for expediting the delivery of significant projects which have 
significant amount, long duration, and high complexity, as depicted in Figure 3.3 and 3.4. 
Amounts and durations of 3R projects in the dataset significantly vary across the project delivery 
methods and contracting strategies. Because the inclusion of all the projects without the 
classification may cause biased results, the research categorized the project data by the project 
characteristics through the detailed classification procedures and initial descriptive analyses.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Research Area 
 
Cost Performance Ratio 
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Figure 3.2. Composition of Initial Dataset 
 
 
 
(a) Number of Projects (b) Budget Allotment ($M) 
  
Figure 3.3. Number of Projects and Budget Allotment by Project Work Types and Project 
Delivery Methods 
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(a) Average Duration (b) No. of Projects (c) Budget Allotment ($M) (d) Average Amount ($M) 
    
Figure 3.4. Number of Projects and Budget Allotment by Project Types and Contracting 
Strategies 
   
 
3.2. Variable Definition and Measurement 
 
Past studies imply that there are numerous factors that may affect project performance: from 
internal project factors to external environments. On the basis of the identification of factors 
along with the data availability, this study defined and measured a series of variables described 
in Table 3.1. For the sake of the comprehensiveness of the study, diverse factors were used in the 
analysis. 
The main variables of interest in this study are schedule and cost performance and 
contingency adjustment. Schedule Performance Ratio (SPR) was defined by dividing the 
difference between original contract days and actual days by original contract days. Similarly, 
Cost Performance Ratio (CPR) was measured by dividing the difference between original 
contract amounts and actual amounts by original contract amounts. Both ratios represents the 
level of schedule and cost growths of the project, and were used in Chapter 4 and 5 as the 
dependent variables. Another important dependent variable used in Chapter 6 is Contingency 
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Adjustment Rate (CAdj). The FDOT’s contingency policy has the combination of the fixed 
percent and amount along with original contract amount, as depicted in Figure 3.10 (FDOT 
2017). However, the contingency policy is not effective to cope with actual cost variances, 
indicating that additional contingency allocation over the contingency limits in the policy is 
required. Therefore, CAdj is defined as the ratio of the additional contingency allocation over 
original contract amounts, which should be added on the contingency limits in the policy, in 
order to accurately and effectively address project cost variances.  
Based on the literature review and the data availability, the study employed various 
factors that may influence project schedule and cost and consequent contingency adjustment, as 
summarized in Table 3.1. To capture the inherent features of the project, project size and 
duration were measured through the cost amount per day (ApD) as a project size indicator, and 
duration-long (DurL) and duration-medium (DurM) as duration dummy variables. ApD was 
measured by dividing original contract amounts by original contract days. For the project 
duration indicators, durations of projects were classified into the four quartiles. Projects ranked 
in over the third quartile (254 to 1717 days) were assigned as DurL. When project durations fell 
between the first and the third quartiles (150 to 253 days), DurM was assigned. Owner’s estimate 
and contingency allocation can serve as parameters that represent owner’s risk perception toward 
the project in the planning phase. For instance, if the owner anticipates higher uncertainties and 
risks in the project, more project cost estimates and contingency amounts would be consequently 
budgeted. To this end, the following factors were included: the ratio of DOT estimate for original 
contract amounts (EOCA), the ratio of contingency difference to DOT estimate (CDE), and the 
ratio of contingency difference to original contract amounts (CDO). 
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The main objective of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of alternative project 
delivery method and contracting strategies. Therefore, they were employed in a form of dummy 
variables: DB (DB), A+B (Cont_A+B), no excuse bonus (Cont_BN), incentive/disincentive 
(Cont_ID), and lump sum (Cont_LS).  
Letting information would either spur or distract contractors’ bidding participation, 
consequently, affecting the level of bidding competition and consequent bidding behavior. To 
take this into account, the variables pertinent to annual and monthly letting information were 
included: the ratio of the original contract amounts of the project for total annual letting amounts 
(PercALA), number of concurrent monthly lettings (ConcML), and concurrent monthly letting 
amount (ConcMLA). The factors related to contractors’ bidding behavior can be indicators for 
bidding competition level and contractors’ risk perception toward the project. Therefore, the 
study employed the ratio of bidding to original contract amount (BOA), number of biddings 
(NB), and standardized standard deviation of bidding amounts (SDBA).  
It is commonly perceived that the expertise and available resources of the contractor can 
influence project performance. This study ranked contractors by their total original contract 
amounts of awarded projects. The study identified the contractors ranked in top 30 as major 
contractors and others as non-major contractors. In comparison with the Engineering News-
Record’s Top 400 Contractors announced during the research period, which were ranked 
according to revenue, the ranks of both this study and Engineering News-Record showed the 
high similarity (Engineering News-Record 2015). Hence, the dummy variable of major 
contractor (Maj) was included as an indicator of the contractor’s expertise and resources.  
During the research period between 2002 and 2011, there occurred the economic crisis in 
2008 and its consequences were substantial for many industries and firms, including the 
 39 
 
construction industry and contractors. Therefore, this economic condition change during the 
period should be taken into account. Moreover, construction projects may be also influenced by 
the surrounding economic environments. For instance, the contractor would be desperate for the 
project under the economic recession, demonstrating better performance (Kometa et al. 1994). 
To this end, the study used the economic recession (Rec) factor in the form of a dummy variable: 
when projects were let since 2008, 1 was assigned. 
 Lastly, for reflecting the performance impacts of a change order, which is one of the 
major themes of this study, a series of the change order factors were measured and employed. In 
Chapter 4, occurrence timing (Timing), schedule change order days (SCR), and cost change 
order amounts (CCR) of individual change order were employed in quantitative models. Timing 
was measured by dividing timing point length of individual change order occurrence date from 
project letting date by total project duration, letting date to completion date. SCR and CCR is the 
ratio of day and cost changes caused by individual change order for original contract days and 
amounts, respectively. In the following Chapter 5 and 6, the aggregated values of change order 
magnitude and occurrence frequency were used, including total schedule change order ratio 
(TSCR), total cost change order ratio (TCCR), and change order frequency (Freq). TSCR and 
TCCR were calculated by dividing total day and cost changes by original contract days and 
amounts, respectively. Freq is a total number of change order of the project. 
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Table 3.1. Summary of Variables Studied 
 
Variable Acronym Unit Measurements 
Performance 
(Dependent) 
Schedule 
Performance Ratio  
SPR % (Actual days – original contract days) / 
original contract days 
 Cost Performance 
Ratio 
CPR % (Actual amounts – original contract 
amounts) / original contract amounts 
Contingency 
Adjustment 
(Dependent) 
Contingency 
Adjustment Rate 
CAdj % (Cost Variance – maximum contingency 
amounts in policy) / Original Contract 
Amounts  
*: 0 if actual cost variance is negative 
Project 
Characteristics 
Amount per Day ApD $mil. Original contract amounts / original 
contract days 
Duration –  
Long 
DurL - 1 if duration is over the 3rd quartile (long 
25%), 0 otherwise 
Duration - 
Medium 
DurM - 1 if duration is between 1st quartile and 3rd 
quartiles (medium 50%), 0 otherwise 
DOT 
Estimate 
DOT Estimate to 
Original Contract 
Amounts 
EOCA % DOT’s initial estimate / original contract 
amounts 
Contingency Contingency 
Difference to DOT 
Estimate 
CDE % (Contingency amounts – maximum 
contingency amounts in policy) / DOT’s 
initial estimate 
 Contingency 
Difference to 
Original Contract 
Amounts 
CDO % (Contingency amounts – maximum 
contingency amounts in policy) / Original 
Contract Amounts 
Project 
Delivery 
Method 
DB DB - 1 if project delivery method is DB, 0 
otherwise 
Contracting 
Strategies 
A+B Cont_AB - 1 if contracting strategy is A+B, 0 
otherwise 
 No Excuse Bonus Cont_BN - 1 if contracting strategy is no excuse 
bonus, 0 otherwise 
 Incentive/ 
Disincentive 
Cont_ID - 1 if contracting strategy is 
incentive/disincentive, 0 otherwise 
 Lump Sum Cont_LS - 1 if contracting strategy is lump sum, 0 
otherwise 
Letting Amount Percent to 
Total Annual 
Letting 
Amounts 
PercALA % Original contract amounts / total annual 
letting amounts 
 Number of 
Concurrent 
Monthly Lettings 
ConcML # Total number of lettings in the same 
month 
 Concurrent 
Monthly Letting 
Amount 
ConcMLA $bil. Total letting amounts in the same month 
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Table 3.1. Summary of Used Variables (continued) 
Variable Acronym Unit Measurements 
Letting Amount Percent to 
Total Annual 
Letting 
Amounts 
PercALA % Original contract amounts / total annual 
letting amounts 
 Number of 
Concurrent 
Monthly Lettings 
ConcML # Total number of lettings in the same 
letting month 
 Concurrent 
Monthly Letting 
Amount 
ConcMLA $bil. Total letting amounts in the same month 
Bidding Bidding to 
Original Amount  
BOA % Winning bidding amounts / original 
contract amounts 
 Number of 
Bidding 
NB # Total number of biddings tendered to the 
project 
 Standardized 
Standard 
Deviation of 
Bidding Amounts 
SDBA % Standardized Standard Deviation of All 
Bidding Amounts 
Contractor Major Contractor Maj - 1 if the awarded contractor is ranked in 
top 30, 0 otherwise 
Economic 
Environment 
Economic 
Recession 
Rec - 1 if letting year is 2008 or later, 0 
otherwise 
Change 
Order 
Total Schedule 
Change Order 
Ratio  
TSCR % Total schedule change order amounts / 
original contract amounts 
 Total Cost Change 
Order Ratio 
TCCR % Total cost change order amounts / original 
contract days 
 Schedule Change 
Order Ratio 
SCR % Schedule change order days caused by 
individual change order / original contract 
days 
 Cost Change 
Order Ratio 
CCR % Cost change order amounts caused by 
individual change order / original contract 
amounts 
 Change Order 
Occurrence 
Timing 
Timing % Timing point length of each change order 
occurrence / total project duration 
 Change Order 
Frequency 
Freq # Total number of change orders 
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3.3. Descriptive Analysis 
 
The initial dataset of 3,007 roadway construction projects obtained from the FDOT formed the 
primary sample for this study. Table 3.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the initial dataset. 
However, the research area of this study is 3R projects under project delivery methods (DB and 
DBB) and contracting strategies (conventional, A+B, no excuse bonus, incentive/disincentive, 
and lump sum). Through the classification procedure, irrelevant data points were excluded to 
meet each chapter’s research objective. In turn, a total of 610 3R projects, which were under DB 
and DBB project delivery methods, were used in Chapter 4. Likewise, Chapter 5 and 6 employed 
a total of 1,053 3R projects that included contracting strategies of conventional, A+B, no excuse 
bonus, incentive/disincentive, and lump sum. In the rest of this section, descriptive statistics for 
several key features were discussed separately.  
 
Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Performance Schedule Performance 
Ratio 
3007 0.177 0.447 -1.000 5.333 
 Cost Performance Ratio 3007 0.030 0.123 -0.987 1.536 
Contingency 
Adjustment  
Contingency Adjustment 
Rate 
3007 0.022 0.054 0.000 1.398 
Project 
Characteristics 
Amount per Day 3007 0.013 0.014 0.000 0.279 
Duration – Long 3007 (Yes: 25.07%) (No: 74.93%) 
 Duration - Medium 3007 (Yes: 49.75%) (No: 50.25%) 
DOT’s 
Estimate 
DOT Estimate to Original 
Contract Amounts 
1423 0.196 0.255 -0.482 0.997 
Contingency Contingency Difference to 
DOT Estimate 
1440 0.000 0.007 -0.026 0.075 
 Contingency Difference to 
Original Contract 
Amounts 
1468 0.007 0.031 -0.025 0.950 
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Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables (continued) 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Delivery 
Method 
DB 1863 (Yes: 16.26%) (No: 83.74%) 
Contracting 
Strategies 
A+B 3007 (Yes: 2.79%) (No: 97.21%) 
No Excuse Bonus 3007 (Yes: 4.19%) (No: 95.81%) 
 Incentive/Disincentive 3007 (Yes: 7.08%) (No: 92.92%) 
 Lump Sum 3007 (Yes: 29.63%) (No: 70.37%) 
Letting Amount Percent to Total 
Annual Letting 
Amounts 
2988 0.003 0.010 0.000 0.363 
 Number of Concurrent 
Monthly Lettings 
3007 30.437 9.621 1 49 
 Concurrent Monthly 
Letting Amount 
3007 135.341 107.424 0.050 489.390 
Bidding Bidding to Original 
Amount  
1500 0.048 0.068 -0.963 0.530 
 Number of Bidding 1509 4.347 2.379 1 18 
 Standardized Standard 
Deviation of Bidding 
Amounts 
1511 0.151 0.222 0 6.9181 
Contractor Major Contractor 1509 (Yes: 58.71%) (No: 41.29%) 
Economic 
Environment 
Economic Recession 3007 (Yes: 27.90%) (No: 72.10%) 
Change Order Total Schedule Change 
Order Ratio  
3007 0.061 0.189 -0.590 3.439 
 Total Cost Change Order 
Ratio 
3007 0.027 0.095 -1.000 1.215 
 Schedule Change Order 
Ratio 
31105 0.018 0.054 -0.800 0.964 
 Cost Change Order Ratio 31105 0.002 0.021 -0.987 0.760 
 Change Order Occurrence 
Timing 
30109 0.625 0.239 0.000 1.000 
 Change Order Frequency 3007 10.035 13.392 0 139 
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3.3.1. Schedule and Cost Overruns and Change Order  
The study firstly examined the frequency of schedule delays and cost overruns in the initial 
dataset of 3,007 highway projects. The most favorable case is that the project is completed 
within planned duration and budget. However, it was seen that only 16.3 percent met both 
targeted duration and budget. The cases within planned duration but over budget accounted for 
only 15.1 percent of total projects. Similarly, 23.2 percent of total projects satisfied initial budget 
plan while having schedule delays. More seriously, 1,365 out of 3,007 projects, which accounted 
for 45.4 percent of total projects, experienced schedule delays and cost overruns simultaneously. 
This reaffirms that schedule and cost growths are ubiquitous and inevitable in any construction 
projects.   
                  (Unit: Count) 
Figure 3.5. Aspects of Schedule and Cost Performance 
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Change orders are considered as a main culprit of schedule delays and cost overruns. 
Some may have impacts on project schedule and/or cost, while some do not. The FDOT 
classifies change orders into 11 categories, as summarized in Table 3.3. When additional money 
is granted for an unexpected work, a contingency supplemental agreement (CN) is made. If a 
specified additional work that requires additional money and/or days occurs, a supplemental 
agreement (SA) is provided. To address additional cost and days caused by a disputed claim, a 
unilateral supplemental agreement (UN) is granted. These three change order types were 
identified as change orders involving schedule and cost changes. With respect to schedule related 
change orders, there are five types. Changed conditions (CO) are an agreement for conditions 
that are different from those in the bidding phase. When schedule needs to be extended for the 
completion of the project, the owner provided a time extension agreement (EA). Holidays can be 
a significant factor for schedule delays. In the case of time extension due to holidays, a holiday 
time extension (HTEX) is granted. For the case of inclement weather, such as hurricane and 
heavy rain which are beyond the prediction and control of project participants, the provision of 
weather days time granted (WE) is inevitable. A contingency work order times adjustment is for 
days granted on the original contingency pay item or on a contingency supplemental agreement. 
There are also change order types that have no impacts on schedule and cost of the project. For 
the purposed of participation modification of already paid items, modifying pay item 
participation (MPRT) is applied. Also, when pay item’s financial project number needs to shift, 
the owner uses movement of item within contract (SPAD). Lastly, in the case that specification 
change should be documented, work order for specification change only (SPEC) is used.  
The initial data sample of 3,007 projects had a total of 30,616 change orders. Of those, 
3R projects experienced a total of 13,461 change orders, which means 3R projects had an 
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average of 12.2 change orders. To better understand the natures of change orders, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.6, the study visualized each change order type’s schedule and cost impacts and 
occurrence frequency in 3R projects. Five percent of those change orders did not have any 
impact on either project days or amounts (change order type: SPAD and SPEC). Change order 
types only pertinent to schedule change accounted for 78.9 percent of the total change orders 
(CO, EA, HTEX, WE, WOTA). Although WE was the most frequent change order type, EA was 
found as a change order type most significantly causing time increases (average 9.73 percent 
increase of original contract days). There are the three change order types that caused the 
concurrent increase in project days and amounts: namely CN, SA, and UN. Those three change 
order types had 16.1 percent of the total change orders. 
 
Table 3.3. Change Order Types in Florida Department of Transportation 
 
Impact Abbrev. Change Order Type Description 
Schedule & 
Cost 
CN Contingency Supplemental 
Agreement 
Additional money granted for unexpected 
work 
 SA Supplemental Agreement Additional money and/or days granted for 
specified additional work 
 UN Unilateral Supplemental 
Agreement 
Document used to pay estimated value of a 
disputed claim 
Schedule CO Changed Conditions Something different than at the time of 
bidding 
 EA Time Extension Agreement Days granted to complete the work 
 HTEX Holiday Time Extension Days granted due to a holiday 
 WE Weather Days Time Granted When days are granted due to inclement 
weather 
 WOTA Contingency Work Order 
Time Adjustment 
Days granted on the original contingency 
pay item or on a contingency SA 
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Table 3.3. Change Order Types in Florida Department of Transportation (continued) 
Impact Abbrev. Change Order Type Description 
None MPRT Modifying Pay Item 
Participation 
Used for changing participation on 
contract items that have already been paid. 
Administrative action only. Does not 
require outside approval 
 SPAD Movement of Item within 
Contract 
Moving pay items from one financial 
project number to another. Administrative 
action only. Does not require outside 
approval 
 SPEC Work Order for Specification 
Change Only 
Used to document any specification 
changes 
 
 
 
(Schedule Change Order Ratio =  
Days Added Due to Change Order / Original Days) 
(Number of Change 
Order) 
(Cost Change Order Ratio = 
Cost Amounts of Change 
Order / Original Amount) 
 
(a) Schedule Impact (b) Frequency (C) Cost Impact 
   
Figure 3.6. Average Schedule and Cost Change by Change Order Types in 3R Projects 
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3.3.2. Project Delivery Methods 
Table 3.4 represents the descriptive statistics for 3R projects under two project delivery methods, 
DBB and DB. The values, in overall, show that DB had more favorable performance and less 
change order impacts. This was also supported by the results from the t-test in Table 4.1. It 
should be noted that the primary goal of DB is to accelerate project delivery. The schedule 
related statistics in Table 3.4 shows that DB was effective in its intention for shortening project 
duration. Figure 3.7 provided average schedule and cost impacts of DBB and DB projects across 
project work types. This also supports that DB had less schedule and cost impacts from change 
orders. 
 
Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics versus Project Delivery Methods in 3R projects 
 
Delivery Method Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
DBB SPR 0.250 0.361 -1.000 2.172  551  
 CPR 0.032 0.147 -0.977 1.536  
 TSCR 0.072 0.166 -0.290 1.417  
 TCCR 0.034 0.094 -0.164 0.995  
 Freq 12.2 14.0 0 124  
DB SPR 0.126 0.336 -0.548 1.217  59  
 CPR 0.047 0.112 -0.194 0.614  
 TSCR 0.044 0.138 -0.172 0.967  
 TCCR 0.013 0.167 -1.000 0.615  
 Freq 5.9 8.2 0.000 53.000  
Total SPR 0.238 0.360 -1.000 2.172  610  
 CPR 0.034 0.144 -0.977 1.536  
 TSCR 0.069 0.164 -0.290 1.417  
 TCCR 0.032 0.104 -1.000 0.995  
 Freq 11.6 13.7 0 124  
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(Schedule Change Order Ratio =  
Days Added Due to Change Order / Original Days) 
(Cost Change Order Ratio = 
Cost Amounts of Change Order / Original Amount) 
 
(a) Schedule Impact (b) Cost Impact 
  
Figure 3.7. Change Order Impact on Schedule and Cost by Project Types and Project Delivery 
Methods 
 
 
3.3.3. Alternative Contracting Strategies 
The effectiveness of alternative contracting strategies is one of the main focuses in this study. 
Most of them are intended to pursue fast-tracking of project completion: specifically, A+B, no 
excuse bonus, and incentive/disincentive. However, the descriptive statistics of some alternative 
contracting strategies in Table 3.5 and Figure 3.8 depict contrary aspects when compared to 
those of the conventional contracting strategy, to the extent. Particularly, all the average values 
of A+B exceeded those of other alternative contracting strategies as well as the conventional 
contracting strategies. No excuse bonus had less schedule delays but more cost overruns than the 
conventional contracting strategy. Incentive/disincentive showed the most desirable aspects, in 
general. Given the relatively simple project scope and low project risks, lump sum is expected to 
be less subject to schedule and cost changes. The statistics of lump sum seem to coincide with 
such expectation. 
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Table 3.5. Descriptive Statistics versus Contracting Strategies in 3R Projects 
 
Contracting Strategy Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Conventional SPR 0.256 0.354 -1.000 2.172  494  
 CPR 0.028 0.150 -0.977 1.536  
 TSCR 0.064 0.150 -0.250 1.045  
 TCCR 0.033 0.094 -0.164 0.995  
 Freq 12.3 13.2 0 90  
A+B SPR 0.241 0.252 -0.168 0.866  38  
 CPR 0.075 0.093 -0.150 0.366  
 TSCR 0.118 0.138 -0.021 0.607  
 TCCR 0.038 0.064 -0.020 0.339  
 Freq 30.4 21.0 0.000 76.000  
No Excuse Bonus SPR 0.109 0.323 -0.350 1.057  70  
 CPR 0.048 0.131 -0.264 0.662  
 TSCR 0.083 0.201 -0.046 0.967  
 TCCR 0.051 0.112 -0.044 0.672  
 Freq 26.8 28.1 0 124  
Incentive/Disincentive SPR 0.056 0.288 -0.280 1.116  85  
 CPR 0.027 0.089 -0.182 0.296  
 TSCR 0.042 0.127 0.000 0.848  
 TCCR 0.033 0.063 -0.055 0.354  
 Freq 14.4 12.0 0 59  
Lump Sum SPR 0.149 0.364 -0.988 1.520  366  
 CPR 0.027 0.082 -0.777 0.606  
 TSCR 0.039 0.125 -0.378 1.417  
 TCCR 0.009 0.072 -1.000 0.254  
 Freq 7.6 7.5 0 48  
Total SPR 0.192 0.354 -1.000 2.172  1,053  
 CPR 0.031 0.123 -0.977 1.536  
 TSCR 0.057 0.145 -0.378 1.417  
 TCCR 0.026 0.086 -1.000 0.995  
 Freq 12.5 14.6 0 124  
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(Schedule Change Order Ratio =  
Days Added Due to Change Order / Original Days) 
(Cost Change Order Ratio = 
Cost Amounts of Change Order / Original Amount) 
 
(a) Schedule Impact (b) Cost Impact 
  
Figure 3.8. Change Order Impact on Schedule and Cost by Contracting Strategies in 3R projects 
 
3.3.4. Owner’s Estimate versus Bidder’s Amounts 
The owner and the contractor would have different risk perspective even toward the same 
project. The gap between their risk perceptions could be intensified or narrowed along with 
different contracting strategy. Such difference in risk perceptions toward contracting strategies 
between those two parties could be represented in their initial estimates. Figure 3.8 provides the 
two stakeholders’ estimate difference from original contract amounts, which can be an indicator 
of the agreed or market price of the project. It is commonly known that STAs usually estimate 
project cost generously and contractors largely attempt to lower their bidding amounts up to their 
available limits to win the bidding. Even considering their different approaches, Figure 3.9 
shows that there were significant differences in the degree of risk perceptions between the two 
sides. Intriguingly, it seems that the both anticipate A+B projects require more costs than original 
contract amounts.  
 
Conventional 
A+B 
No Excuse Bonus 
Incentive/Disincentive 
Lump Sum 
3R Total 
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Figure 3.9. Owner’s Estimate versus Bidder’s Bidding Amounts by Contracting Strategies in 3R 
Projects 
 
 
3.3.5. Contingency 
The FDOT (2017) has a unique contingency policy consisting of fixed rates and amounts by 
original contract amounts. Figure 3.10 clearly illustrates the significant discrepancy between 
contingency amount limits in their policy and actual cost variances. However, the FDOT 
assigned additional contingency amounts (CDO) over the limits in the policy. Although CDO 
would be intended to cope with anticipated excessive risks, Figure 3.11 shows that it did not 
complement the actual required costs, CAdj, by contracting strategies. To this end, contingency 
adjustment needs to be revised for the sake of realistic contingency practice. 
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Figure 3.10. Contingency Policy versus Actual Cost Variances in 3R Projects 
 
 
Figure 3.11. Actual Additional Contingency Allocation versus Required Additional Contingency 
by Contracting Strategies in 3R Projects 
 
3.3.6. Major and Non-Major Contractors 
As stated earlier, the expertise and resources of the contractor can be also a significant factor 
affecting project performance. The construction industry appears to be a competitive market 
because it is in nature a bidding market where contractors keenly compete. However, the reality 
is that the construction industry is akin to an oligopolistic market (OECD 2008). Bidding award 
information in the dataset also represents such an oligopolistic aspect. Specifically, major 
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contractors (top 30) displayed higher contract winning probability and, consequently, were 
awarded 78.0 and 81.9 percent of the total contract amounts of the entire projects and 3R 
projects, respectively, as shown in Figure 3.12 and Table 3.6. Therefore, a single major 
contractor’s impact can be significant. Considering their expertise, size, and resources, they are 
expected to be more successful in restraining schedule delays and cost overruns than non-major 
contractors. However, all the average values of SPR, CPR, TSCR, and TCCR in 3R projects 
were inferior to those of non-major contractors. This would be attributed to the fact that they 
usually carry out large and complicated projects. 
 
 
Figure 3.12. Bid Winning Trend of Major and Non-Major Contractors by Letting Year 
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Table 3.6. Descriptive Statistics by Major and Non-Major Contractors 
 
Project Work 
Type 
Contractor 
No. of 
Projects 
Total 
Awarded 
Amounts 
($M) 
SPR CPR TSCR TCCR 
Total Major 886 5,475.34  16.94% 2.74% 4.94% 2.12% 
 Non-Major 623 1,543.71  21.38% 1.96% 7.16% 2.10% 
3R Major 518  3,059.89  19.60% 2.49% 5.34% 2.06% 
 Non-Major 224  677.12  16.96% 0.70% 4.31% 1.46% 
Bridge Major 17  160.56  9.20% 4.00% 3.83% 2.07% 
 Non-Major 25  56.79  22.10% 3.14% 4.37% 1.69% 
Bridge Repair Major 14  62.56  21.78% 3.33% 2.69% 2.56% 
 Non-Major 34  85.54  23.95% 4.33% 7.04% 1.90% 
Capacity Added Major 49  332.66  9.40% 3.81% 3.31% 2.67% 
 Non-Major 34  91.47  10.58% 1.70% 2.14% 1.25% 
New Major 34  694.69  18.22% 8.38% 8.56% 5.29% 
 Non-Major 20  173.36  28.49% 6.27% 11.59% 4.23% 
Others Major 254  1,164.98  13.05% 2.17% 4.14% 1.69% 
 Non-Major 286  459.44  25.23% 2.29% 9.93% 2.61% 
 
3.3.7. Economic Recession 
The construction industry is inherently prone to changes in economic environments. 
Consequently, contractors’ behavior, especially toward project performance management, is 
highly likely to be subject to economic condition changes. To take an example, as depicted in 
Figure 3.13, after the economic recession in 2008, the bidding completion became keener. 
 It seems that the economic crisis evoked the improvement of contractors’ performance 
management. Compared to the performance parameters before that economic shock, contractors 
demonstrated better performance in both project schedule and cost, as shown in Table 3.7. 
However, this might be also due to the decrease in the letting of huge-scaled and complicated 
projects. 
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Figure 3.13. Letting and Bidding Trend Change by Letting Year 
 
 
Table 3.7. Project Performance Change by Economic Recession 
 
Period 
Average 
Amounts 
($M) 
No. of 
Bidding 
SPR CPR TSCR TCCR Freq 
Total 4.84 4.17 19.39% 3.21% 5.68% 2.59%   12.3  
2003-2007 5.96 3.64 21.58% 4.17% 6.75% 3.13% 12.8  
2008-2011 2.25 5.12 14.33% 0.98% 3.20% 1.33% 11.1  
 
 
3.4. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter discussed the characteristics and descriptive analysis results of the research dataset 
and variables used in the study. Given the recent roadway construction trend shift from new 
construction to rehabilitation, this study focused on 3R projects. In an attempt to derive 
comprehensive analysis results, through data classification and measurements, the study 
identified various candidate factors. The study also conducted a series of descriptive analyses to 
examine the aspects of the key factors in the study. The notable findings in this chapter are 
summarized as the following:  
Amounts 
($M) 
No. of 
Lettings 
 
 
No. of 
Biddings 
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 Schedule delays and cost overruns were prevalent: 84.7 percent of the total projects in 
this study experienced schedule and/or cost growths. With respect to the effectiveness of 
alternative project delivery method, DB seemed to have less schedule delays and cost overruns 
than the traditional DBB. Alternative contracting strategies showed somewhat contradictory 
aspects against its intended purpose in the acceleration of project completion. It was seen that the 
owner and contractor had significantly different estimates, that is, different risk perceptions. 
Contingency practice was not effective to address actual cost variances. Unlike the common 
belief, projects with major contractors appeared to have more schedule and cost growths than 
those of non-major contractors. Finally, projects tendered since the economic recession in 2008 
looked to experience lower increases in schedule and cost. 
 However, it should be noted that the stated findings in this chapter were only based on 
the initial descriptive analysis. Therefore, for the performance impacts of each key features, 
statistical analysis results in the later chapters should be referred. 
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4. PERFORMANCE IMPACTS OF PROJECT DELIVERY METHODS 
 
This chapter addressed the first research objective that sought the quantification of change order 
magnitude and occurrence timing impacts under two project delivery methods, DB and DBB. To 
achieve the research objective in this chapter, the study conducted a t-test and multiple linear 
regression analysis using 610 3R projects.  
 
4.1. Project Delivery Methods and Change Order 
 
Since U.S. highway systems have been significantly obsolete and deteriorated, consequent 
rehabilitation works have been a major concern of every STAs over decades (Choi and Kwak 
2012; Choi 2010; Napolitan and Zegras 2008). However, roadway rehabilitation projects often 
cause additional traffic delays, public inconvenience, and economic losses in surrounding 
communities and business (Choi and Kwak 2012; Choi et al. 2011; Choi 2010). Therefore, 
acceleration of project completion can play a pivotal role in minimizing those unfavorable 
impacts of roadway construction projects. To this end, alternative project delivery method, such 
as DB, has been widely adopted in highway renewal projects over the past two decades. 
However, research findings about its effects on project performance are inconsistent.  
In addition, due to the inherently uncertain nature of construction projects, change orders 
are prevalent and serve as a main cause of schedule delays and cost overruns productivity (Assaf 
and Al-Hejji 2006; Chester and Hendrickson 2005; Fayek et al. 2003; Fayek and Oduba 2005; 
Moselhi et al. 2005; Wichern 2004). Hence, considerable amounts of past studies have focused 
on unfavorable impacts of change orders from various research perspectives. However, there is 
no available information about the timing impacts of change order occurrence on project 
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performance. The effect of any event, especially when it is unexpected and undesirable, can vary 
depending on its occurrence timing. In an attempt to fill the above two gaps in the current 
knowledge, the study pursued the development of quantitative models that can predict the 
impacts of change order magnitude and occurrence timing on project schedule and cost under 
given project delivery methods. Pertinent descriptive and comparative analyses were also 
conducted to provide explicit information about the effectiveness of the alternative delivery 
method, DB. 
 
4.2. Project Performance Comparison of Project Delivery Methods 
 
Prior to investigating timing impacts of change orders on project cost and schedule under 
different project delivery methods, a number of initial comparative analyses were conducted to 
examine aspects of change order magnitude, frequency, occurrence timing, and project 
performance between DB and DBB methods.  
Figure 4.1 (a)-(d) illustrate frequency and occurrence timing of change orders, and 
project cost and schedule performance between the two project delivery methods. It is commonly 
perceived that projects under a DB delivery method are likely to experience more frequent and 
influential change orders due to a lack of the design integrity in the initial project 
commencement. However, DB projects analyzed in this study showed nearly a half of changer 
order frequency of DBB projects on average: as depicted in Figure 4.1 (a), 6.3 and 12.3 changer 
orders per project under DB and DBB, respectively. The distribution of change order frequency 
with 5 intervals (no, 1-5, 6-10, and over 10 change orders), as shown in Figure 4.2, also clearly 
illustrated that DBB projects had more change orders.  
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Average occurrence timing of change orders indicated that DB projects had a tendency of 
later occurrence: an average timing at 62.42 and 59.39 percent of the total project duration, for 
DB and DBB projects, respectively. When examining the distribution of change order occurrence 
by project quartiles, as illustrated in Figure 4.3, over 75 percent of change orders took place 
during the latter half of the project duration under DB, while DBB had approximately 60 percent 
of change orders during the later half. This later change order occurrence tendency in DB 
projects may attribute to the inherent nature of the DB approach. In a delivery process under DB, 
the construction phase starts early with uncompleted design work scopes to fast-track project 
delivery. Consequently, the latent factors affecting project time and cost are likely to be detected 
later, resulting in delayed confirmation and alteration of project design and work scopes. 
 
     
       (a) Average Change Order Frequency (b) Average Change Order Occurrence Timing 
 
       (c) Average Schedule Change Order Ratio     (d) Average Cost Change Order Ratio 
 
Figure 4.1. Average Change Order Frequency, Occurrence Timing, and Performance Impacts by 
Delivery Methods 
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Figure 4.2. Distribution of Change Order Frequency by Project Delivery Methods 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Distribution of Change Order Occurrence Timing by Project Duration Quartile 
 
In an attempt to examine the direct impact of a change order on schedule and cost by 
their occurrence timing, the study also visualized the average schedule and cost change order 
ratios by the project duration quartiles, as given in Figure 4.1 (c), (d), and Figure 4.4. Contrary to 
the common notion, schedule and cost impacts of change orders under DB projects seem to be 
slightly lower than those under DBB projects. The average change order magnitude of DBB 
projects tend to obey the common notion that later occurrence of change orders has more 
negative impacts on project schedule and cost. On the other hand, that of DB projects showed 
18.0% 17.6%
20.6%
43.7%
19.4%
38.9%
36.1%
5.6%
No 1-5 6-10 Over 10
DBB DB
6.8%
33.0%
40.1%
20.2%
5.3%
18.9%
48.2%
27.6%
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
DBB DB
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flat or partially decreasing trends along with the project duration quartiles. However, the Tukey 
Honest Significant Difference (HSD) pairwise test results did not provide sufficient evidence that 
there was the significant difference in added days and cost by a change order. To this end, the 
corresponding test results were not included in this paper. 
 
 
(a) Average Schedule Change Order Ratio     (b) Average Cost Change Order Ratio 
  
Figure 4.4. Change Order Cost and Schedule Ratios by Project Duration Quartile 
 
One of the main objectives in this chapter is to test whether there are significant 
differences in the effectiveness on project schedule and cost between DB and DBB. To achieve 
this goal, this study initially used box-plots that can intuitively show the performance differences 
between the two project delivery methods. Figure 4.5 depicted that DB projects analyzed in this 
study had less schedule delays and cost overruns than traditional DBB projects. However, the 
data did not satisfy the normality assumption that is essential to conduct a parametric comparison 
analysis, that is, the Tukey HSD pairwise test. In order to address this normality violation in the 
data, the study applied a natural log-log transformation to both the schedule and cost 
performance ratio variables. As shown in Table 4.1, comparative analysis results were obtained 
using the Tukey HSD pairwise test. Compared to an ANOVA test that determines whether the 
test result is significant, the Tukey HSD test allows identifying how specific test group’s means 
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are different from each other. The results clearly provided a significant evidence that, as initially 
identified via box-plots, DB projects experienced less schedule delays and cost overruns. This 
result affirms the previous studies’ findings that DB outperformed DBB in both project schedule 
and cost (Hale et al. 2009; Konchar and Sanvido 1998; Molenaar and Songer 1998; Songer et al. 
1996). 
 
 
         
(Schedule Performance Ratio =  
Actual Days / Original Contract Days) 
(Cost Performance Ratio = 
Actual Amount / Original Contract Amount) 
 
(a) Schedule Performance (b) Cost Performance 
  
Figure 4.5. Box-Plots of Schedule and Cost Performance by Project Delivery Methods 
 
 
Table 4.1. Tukey HSD Pairwise Comparison of Schedule and Cost Performance 
 
Variables Level (i) Level (j) Difference (i-j) Std Error t Ratio p>| t | 
Log(SPR) DB DBB -0.5868 0.0640 -9.17 .000 
Log(CPR) DB DBB -0.9837 0.1770 -5.56 .000 
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4.3. Model Development 
 
The primary aim of this study in this chapter is to develop a quantitative model for the impacts of 
change order magnitude, frequency, and occurrence timing on project schedule and cost. To this 
end, the study developed two multiple linear regression models for project schedule and cost, 
respectively.  
 
4.3.1. Variable Selection 
To achieve the research objective, this study extracted the data of 610 3R projects, which include 
project delivery method information, through the data classification. Those 610 3R projects had a 
total of 13,710 change orders. The study measured and selected variables applicable to the 
intended research objective, as describe in Table 4.2. However, it should be noted that the 
bidding and contract procedure of DB is inherently value-based selection, which means that DB 
is not an open competitive bidding. Therefore, available information is highly limited. In this 
sense, some information, including estimate, contingency, letting, bidding, and contractor related 
factors, was not used in this study. 
For the dependent variables, schedule and cost performance ratio variables (SPR and 
CPR) were used. With respect to the project characteristics variables, as depicted in Table 3.1 in 
Chapter 3, the study initially considered the use of ApD, DurqL, and DurqM. However, they 
were not statistically significant in the initial analysis. Alternatively, the study employed original 
contract days and amounts (OrgD and OrgA). As an indicator of project delivery methods, a 
dummy variable of DB was used, which was assigned 1 and 0 for DB and DBB, respectively. 
Aside from project delivery methods, the project may also involve alternative contracting 
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strategies. In an attempt to isolate their likely impacts on project performance, this study 
assigned 1 and 0 for alternative contracting strategies and the conventional method to the 
corresponding dummy variable (Cont). To reflect the possible impacts of the surrounding 
economic environments, Rec was included in the analysis. Lastly, change order information, 
including TSCR, TCCR, SCR, CCR, and Timing were employed to investigate the impacts of 
change orders on project performance. 
 
Table 4.2. Variables Studied 
Variable Acronym Unit Measurements 
Performance 
(Dependent) 
Schedule 
Performance Ratio  
SPR % (Actual days – original contract days) / 
original contract days 
 Cost Performance 
Ratio 
CPR % (Actual amounts – original contract 
amounts) / original contract amounts 
Project 
Characteristics 
Log(Original 
Contract Days) 
LnOrgD # Log-log transformed original contract 
days 
 Log(Original 
Contract Amounts) 
LnOrgA $ Log-log transformed original contract 
amounts 
Project 
Delivery 
Method 
DB DB - 1 if project delivery method is DB, 0 
otherwise 
Contracting 
Strategies 
Alternative 
Contracting 
Strategies 
Cont - 1 if contracting strategy is an alternative 
contracting strategy, 0 if conventional 
Economic 
Environment 
Economic Recession Rec - 1 if letting year is 2008 or later, 0 
otherwise 
Change Order Total Schedule 
Change Order Ratio  
TSCR % Total schedule change order amounts / 
original contract amounts 
 Total Cost Change 
Order Ratio 
TCCR % Total cost change order amounts / original 
contract days 
 Schedule Change 
Order Ratio 
SCR % Schedule change order days caused by 
individual change order / original contract 
days 
 Cost Change Order 
Ratio 
CCR % Cost change order amounts caused by 
individual change order / original contract 
amounts 
 Change Order 
Occurrence Timing 
Timing % Timing point length of each change order 
occurrence / total project duration 
 
4.3.2. Model Development for Project Performance 
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Based on the identified variables in this chapter and the Eq. (1) and (2) in Chapter 1, this study 
developed the hypothetical model, as illustrated  in Figure 4.6. This study initially hypothesized 
that all the changer order variables have positive impacts on project schedule and cost, meaning 
that later occurrence and higher magnitude of change order caused more schedule delays and 
cost overruns. With respect to project characteristics, it is commonly believed that projects with 
large amounts and longer durations usually have the higher degrees of risks, and consequently, 
the higher possibility of schedule delays and cost overruns. To this end, this study embraced such 
perception as the hypotheses for the project characteristics. In the literature, alternative project 
delivery method and contracting strategies are usually expected to have less schedule delays and 
cost overruns. Therefore, this study presumed that they have negative relationships with project 
schedule and cost growths. Finally, Rec was included in the hypothetical model to take into 
account the impacts of the economic recession on project performance. Under the economic 
recession, both the contactor and the owner are likely to make intensive management efforts. 
Therefore, negative relationships with schedule and cost growths were assumed.  
 
 
Figure 4.6. Hypothetical Model for Schedule and Cost Performance under Project Delivery 
Methods 
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4.4. Analysis Results and Discussions 
 
From the hypothetical model developed based on the proposed Eq. (1) and (2) in Chapter 1, a 
multiple linear regression analysis was conducted. The required assumption check, analysis 
results, and corresponding implications of the findings were discussed in this section.  
 
4.4.1. Overview of Analysis Results 
To investigate the timing impacts of change order occurrence under two different project 
delivery methods, DB and DBB, this study analyzed the dataset of 13,710 change orders that 
were from 610 3R projects completed between 2002 and 2011 in Florida. Prior to arrive at the 
final models, the study conducted the diagnostics of assumptions required in the regression 
analysis. The validity of a regression model is determined based on rigid assumptions about the 
normality, homoscedasticity, and homogeneity of variances. The validation of these assumptions 
is essential for a reliable interpretation of causal relationships among the variables in the 
regression model (Jafarzadeh et al. 2013).  With respect to the normality of residuals and 
heteroscedasticity, the residuals from the initial multiple linear regression analysis were 
abnormally distributed, thereby involving the heteroscedasticity existence. To circumvent this 
issue, outliers were excluded and a natural log-log transformation was applied to the OrgD and 
OrgA variables. In addition, as a means to detect the possible multicollinearity existence, this 
study diagnosed the value inflation factor (VIF) values of variables in individual model. A VIF 
value of 10 or more, in general, is considered as an indicator of a high correlation 
between/among factors (Belsley et al. 2005). The VIF diagnostic results indicated that all the 
calculated values did not exceed 4. 
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Through the assumption check, this study finalized the analysis and obtained the results, 
as summarized in Table 4.3. During the analysis, statistically insignificant variables were 
excluded by applying a stepwise regression method with backward elimination procedure. The 
adjusted R-squared values of the estimated performance models varied from 0.56 to 73.17 
percent. Looking at the adjusted R-squared values of the final models (S-4 and C-4) for project 
schedule and cost performance, the variables therein explained 45.15 and 73.17 percent of the 
variation in the two dependent variables, SPR and CPR, respectively. One noteworthy aspect in 
the models are variability of change order related information. The literature indicates that the 
project characteristics (OrgD and OrgA) are considered as one of the most significantly 
influential factors on project schedule and cost performance. However, the adjusted R-squared 
values of the models with only the project characteristics variables implied that their explanation 
power was not high, in general. Rather, change order related factors, especially TSCR and 
TCCR, accounted for the more significant variability in the dependent variables.   
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4.4.2. Implications of Performance Models 
By conducting rigorous statistical analyses on the dataset consisted of 13,710 change orders in 
610 3R roadway projects, the study examined the timing impacts of change order occurrence 
under DB and DBB project delivery methods. As a result, this study captured several key 
findings, which can provide significant quantitative insights into the timing impacts of change 
order occurrence and the effectiveness of DB. 
 Project schedule and cost can be influenced by numerous factors, including project 
internal to external conditions. Of those, project size and duration are considered as key factors 
to project schedule and cost changes. Specifically, it is commonly preceived that the larger and 
longer the project is, the more schedule delays and cost overruns the project may experience. 
However, the performance impacts of the project characteristics in this study revealed somewhat 
different aspects. As summarized in Table 4.3, OrgD showed negative relationships with SPR, 
whereas OrgA had positive associations. Meanwhile, the countertrend was seen in the impacts of 
OrgD and OrgA on CPR. These contradictory aspects could be explained that if the project has 
large project budget amounts, there would follow intentional management efforts to save the 
costs. Conversely, managerial efforts to reduce project duration would be taken for the project 
with long duration. Either cost savings or duration reductions may require additional days or 
costs, respectively. This sort of trade-offs between schedule and cost might be a root cause of the 
counter effects between project size and duration on project performance.  
 Since the application of alternative project delivery method and contracting strategies can 
play a pivotal role in improving project performance, this study also examined their 
effectiveness. Their primary purpose is to accelerate project completion, thereby having less 
schedule delays than the traditional approaches. The analysis results in this study supported that 
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they were effective in restraining schedule growths as intended. Particularly, based on the results 
from the model S-4, DB had less schedule delays by 3.91 percent than DBB and the use of 
alternative contracting strategies alleviated schedule growths by 2.47 percent than the traditional 
contracting strategy. DB was also helpful in constraining cost overruns, as shown in the model 
C-4 in Table 4.3. It showed less schedule increases of 0.58 percent than DBB. However, in the 
same model, it was seen that alternative contracting strategies had more cost growths than the 
traditional method. This would be attributed to the probable trade-offs between schedule and 
cost, meaning that there were more cost overruns at the expense of duration reductions. 
 This study has the 10-year research period between 2002 and 2011. In the late-point of 
the research period, there was the tremendous economic shock that had an enormous effect 
across the globe and nearly all industries. Rec, an indicator variable for examining the impact of 
the economic recession in 2008, implied that the economic crisis had effects of depression in 
schedule and cost increases. As stated earlier, any organizations as economic units, including the 
contractor and the owner, may redouble their managerial efforts to overcome challenges under 
the economic crisis. In particular, the results from the models S-4 and C-4 showed that 1.42 and 
2.17 percent of schedule and cost reductions were implemented since 2008, respectively. 
 The main theme of this chapter is the timing impacts of change order occurrence on 
project performance. In addition, this study included other change order factors since change 
orders are one of root causes of schedule delays and cost overruns. The results revealed the 
interesting nature of change orders. Understandably, schedule and cost were significantly and 
positively influenced by schedule and cost change order related factors, respectively. It is 
noteworthy that TCCR had a statistically significant impact on schedule performance in the 
model S-3. However, it did not hold the statistical significance after the inclusion of SCR in the 
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model S-4. Conversely, TSCR was strongly tied with both project schedule and cost. The models 
S-4 and C-4 implied that the increase of 1 percent point in TSCR can lead to 1.00 and 0.05 
percent growths of project schedule and cost, respectively. With respect to the impacts of TCCR, 
the model C-4 indicated that 1 percent point increase in TCCR may increase of 0.93 percent in 
project cost. 
 The factors related to individual change order, SCR, CCR, and Timing, were generally 
associated with project schedule. Particularly, SCR and CCR were only influential on project 
schedule and their impacts were opposite to each other. While SCR had a positive relationship 
with project schedule, CCR was negatively associated with schedule increases. Negative impacts 
of CCR would be explained that some of cost related change orders might be employed to 
directly shorten project duration or might act as an indirect stimulator for accelerating project 
completion. With respect to the timing impacts of change order occurrence, although Timing 
showed a positive relationship with cost performance in the model C-4, its high p-value ( 0.0979) 
and identical adjusted R-squared values (0.7317) of the model C-3 and C-4 indicated that the 
impact of Timing is negligible in the estimation of cost performance. As for the most significant 
finding, the timing impacts of change order occurrence in this study were against the common 
perception and the results of the past studies. Akin to the common belief, the previous studies 
that have focused on the timing effects of change orders on labor productivity represented that 
later occurrence of change orders led to a more adverse impact on project duration. However, the 
results in this study revealed that change order occurrence in the later construction phase caused 
less schedule growths, which later change order occurrence by 10 percent of total project 
duration would have less schedule delays by 0.6 percent. The possible explanation for these 
discrepant aspects would be found from the change order practice in roadway construction 
 73 
 
projects. In practice, a significant need for the modification of project design and work scopes is 
likely to arise in the initial stage of the project. For instance, if required, the owner may initiate 
significant changes early to meet their certain special requirements or improve the project 
quality. In another case, unforeseen geological or social conditions detected at the beginning of 
construction may compel the alteration of the original design and work scopes. However, in the 
late project phase, the owner would not be willing to make critical changes unless they are 
inevitable because design and work scopes are already defined and any change may cause a 
substantial impact on project performance.  
 
 
4.5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The DB project delivery method has been widely applied in the AEC industry mainly due to its 
decisive advantages in cutting the project duration and improving communication among 
stakeholders. STAs have also adopted this alternative method to fulfill the objects of fast-
tracking project delivery and minimizing the inconvenience of the traveling public over the past 
two decades. Yet, its effectiveness on project performance still needs more investigation. 
Specifically, limited information is available about the impacts of change order magnitude, 
frequency, occurrence timing on project schedule and cost of the project under a DB setting. To 
fill these gaps, the study examined and compared change order aspects and project performance 
between DB and traditional DBB. Quantitative models for project schedule and cost were then 
developed by conducting a multiple linear regression analysis on the dataset of 13,710 change 
orders from 610 3R projects completed between 2002 and 2011 in Florida. 
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The study identified the following noteworthy findings through a series of analyses 
conducted herein. 3R DB projects experienced less frequent change orders and lower schedule 
and cost overruns than DBB projects. This reaffirms the findings of the most previous studies 
that DB was more effective in restraining change orders and the consequent unfavorable impacts 
of change orders on project schedule and cost. However, there was no significant difference in 
days and amounts added by a change order between DB and DBB projects. This implies that 
project delivery methods had no influence on the magnitude of a change order. Nevertheless, 
change order magnitudes clearly led to the adverse impacts on schedule and time performance of 
the project. Finally, the timing of change order occurrence mainly influenced on project 
schedule, while the timing impacts of change order on project cost were negligible. Particularly, 
the project schedule performance model presented that later occurrence of a change order caused 
less impacts on the growth of the total project duration.  
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the study took a first step in empirically 
examining the timing impacts of change order occurrence under a DB setting. The findings and 
quantitative models developed in the study can consequently advance decision-makers’ 
quantitative insights toward the effectiveness of the DB delivery method and the likely timing 
impacts of change order occurrence. 
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5. PERFORMANCE IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE CONTRACTING STRATEGIES 
 
This chapter addressed the second research objective, which aimed at the development of 
performance models that includes the simultaneity in project schedule and cost under alternative 
contracting strategies. By applying the three-stage least squares to the research sample of 1,053 
3R projects, project schedule and cost performance models were obtained. The results affirmed 
the existence of the simultaneity in schedule and cost and provided quantitative insights toward 
the performance impacts of alternative contracting strategies and other noteworthy factors’ 
relationships with project performance. 
 
5.1. Alternative Contracting Strategies and Simultaneity in Schedule and Cost 
 
Due to pressing needs for the acceleration of project completion, the use of alternative 
contracting strategies such as A+B, no excuse bonus, and incentive/disincentive have increased 
in roadway construction projects. Subsequently, there have been countless past studies on 
alternative contracting strategies. However, they have mainly focused on A+B and 
incentive/disincentive while other alternative contracting approaches such as no excuse bonus 
and lump sum have been understudied. Furthermore, research results about the performance 
impacts of alternative contracting strategies have been incongruent. Therefore, further research 
on the effectiveness of alternative contracting strategies is essential, especially considering the 
emerging needs for the substantial rehabilitation of the significantly aged and damaged roadway 
facilities.  
Another fundamental question in this study is whether project schedule and cost are 
cross-correlated. Since both schedule and cost can be influenced by same or similar risk factors, 
 76 
 
they are highly likely to be interdependent (Bhargava et al. 2010; Bordat et al. 2004; Chan and 
Kumaraswamy 1997; Chang 2002; Choi and Kwak 2012; Flyvbjerg et al. 2003; Flyvbjerg et al. 
2004; Jahren and Ashe 1990; Williams 2005; Zheng and Ng 2005). However, most of past 
studies have considered schedule and cost separately when conducting analysis, and only limited 
numbers of studies have addressed their simultaneity (Anastasopoulos et al. 2010; Bhargava et 
al. 2010; Lin 2005). The latter proved the existence of the simultaneity in schedule and cost. 
They also indicated that such simultaneity should be taken into account for the sake of the 
accuracy and efficiency of performance estimation.  
In particular, there is no satisfactory performance models that take account of the 
simultaneity in schedule and cost. To tackle this gap, this study developed models that can 
quantify the impacts of alternative contracting strategies with consideration of the simultaneity in 
schedule and cost. 
 
 
5.2. Performance Comparison by Alternative Contracting Strategies 
 
Alternative contracting strategies have gained in popularity largely due to their believed 
advantages, such as shortening project durations or reducing project cost variances. However, 
their effectiveness has not been sufficiently investigated to date. To fill this knowledge gap, this 
study sought to compare the performance impacts of alternative contracting strategies and 
develop numerical models that quantify their possible impacts on project schedule and cost. To 
this end, the study compared their schedule and cost performance by employing statistical 
comparative analysis technique.  
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 Figure 5.1 and 5.2 represent box-plots of schedule and cost performance among the five 
different contracting strategies: namely, conventional, A+B, no excuse bonus, I/D, and lump 
sum. The box-plots of schedule performance indicated that no excuse bonus and I/D had less 
schedule delays than the other three contracting strategies. Those of cost performance implied 
that A+B had more cost overruns, whereas there was no identifiable difference among the other 
four contracting strategies. 
 
Figure 5.1. Box-Plots of Schedule Performance versus Contracting Strategies 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Box-Plots of Cost Performance versus Contracting Strategies 
 
As a means to statistically compare the performance impacts of the five different 
contracting strategies, the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was firstly considered. 
However, the normality assumption that is essential for that test did not hold in both the schedule 
and cost performance ratio variables because their distributions are highly right-skewed, as 
depicted in figure 5.3. Although the study then examined whether variable transformations can 
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circumvent the normality violence, no normal bell-shaped distribution was observed. Thus, it 
was concluded that parametric analysis could not be applied in this case.  
Alternatively, this study conducted the Kruskal-Wallis test, which is a commonly used 
non-parametric analysis in the case that the normality assumption for a parametric comparative 
analysis cannot be met. To represent a post hoc pairwise comparison of the performance impact 
among the contracting strategies, the Dunn test followed. Table 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the results 
from the Kruskal-Wallis rank test and Dunn test performed on schedule performance ratios. The 
chi-squared value of the Kruskal-Wallis rank test indicated that there was a statistically 
significant difference among the contracting strategy groups: chi-squared 53.532 with p-value 
0.000. With respect to the pairwise comparison between contracting strategies, as shown in table 
5.2, it was seen that A+B and conventional approaches had the highest severity of schedule 
delays, while there was no statistical difference between them, which means their schedule delay 
aspects were similar. Lump sum then followed. On the other hand, no excuse bonus and I/D were 
identified to be resistant to schedule growths than the other strategies. With respect to their 
statistical difference, it was found that I/D was slightly better than no excuse bonus in restraining 
schedule growths. In one word, their severity aspects in schedule delays could be expressed in 
the order of “A+B = conventional > lump sum > no excuse bonus > I/D.” Only for the sake of 
project schedule, I/D and no excuse bonus would be favorable. 
 
Table 5.1. Kruskal-Wallis Rank Test Results of Schedule Performance by Contracting Strategies 
 
Contracting Strategies N Rank Sum Chi-Squared 
A+B 30 10722.5 
53.532 
(df = 4, p = 0.000) 
 
No Excuse Bonus 38 8673.0 
Conventional 304 105570.0 
I/D 59 10553.5 
Lump Sum 195 60732.0 
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Table 5.2. Schedule Performance Comparison Results from Dunn Test 
 
Mean Difference:  
(a) – (b) 
(a) 
A+B No Excuse Bonus Conventional I/D 
(b) 
No Excuse Bonus 
2.925*** 
(0.002) 
- - - 
Conventional 
0.293 
(0.385) 
-3.825*** 
(0.000) 
- - 
I/D 
4.403*** 
(0.000) 
1.312* 
(0.095) 
6.545*** 
(0.000) 
- 
Lump Sum 
1.296* 
(0.098) 
-2.595*** 
(0.005) 
2.159** 
(0.015) 
-4.934*** 
(0.000) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(p-values in parentheses.) 
 
 The study also compared cost performance of the five contracting strategies using the 
same methods, as depicted in table 5.3 and 5.4. The chi-squared value of the corresponding 
Kruskal-Wallis rank test also revealed that cost performance among the contracting strategies 
was statistically different. In detail, as represented in table 5.4, A+B was identified as the worst 
contracting strategy on aspects of cost overruns. Contrary to the results of schedule performance 
comparison, no excuse bonus had more severe cost growths than conventional, I/D, and lump 
sum approaches. However, there was no statistically significant difference among those three 
contracting strategies. Therefore, the cost growth severity of the five contracting strategies can 
be portrayed in the order of “A+B > no excuse bonus > conventional = I/D = lump sum.”  
 
Table 5.3. Kruskal-Wallis Rank Test Results of Cost Performance by Contracting Strategies 
 
Contracting Strategies N Rank Sum Chi-Squared 
A+B 30 12814.5 
15.552  
(df = 4, p = 0.004) 
 
No Excuse Bonus 38 13267.5 
Conventional 304 93661.0 
I/D 59 16693.0 
Lump Sum 195 59815.0 
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Table 5.4. Cost Performance Comparison Results from Dunn Test 
 
Mean Difference:  
(a) – (b) 
(a) 
A+B No Excuse Bonus Conventional I/D 
(b) 
No Excuse Bonus 
1.766** 
(0.039) 
- - - 
Conventional 
3.440*** 
(0.000) 
1.319* 
(0.094) 
- - 
I/D 
3.556*** 
(0.000) 
1.760** 
(0.039) 
0.978 
(0.164) 
- 
Lump Sum 
3.395*** 
(0.000) 
1.322* 
(0.093) 
0.082 
(0.468) 
-0.886 
(0.188) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(p-values in parentheses.) 
 
 Synthesizing the comparison results of the schedule and cost performance among the five 
contracting strategies, the overall results revealed some contrary results to the common 
expectations about the effectiveness of contracting strategies. Intriguingly, A+B was turned out 
to be the most unfavorable method both in project schedule and cost, whereas I/D showed the 
promising aspects in schedule and cost variances. No excuse bonus was also relatively effective 
in constraining schedule growths as intended, while showing the high possibility of cost 
overruns. Whilst there was no statistical difference in cost growths among conventional, I/D, and 
lump sum methods, the conventional method had the severest schedule delays and lump sum 
approach followed by. Therefore, the results implied that our perceptions need to be readjusted 
for a better selection of contracting strategies pertinent to project purposes. 
 
 
5.3. Modeling Performance Impacts of Alternative Contracting Strategies 
 
On the basis of the results of the previous comparative analysis, the study found significant 
differences in project performance among the contracting strategies. In addition, from the 
comprehensive literature review, candidate variables influencing project performance were also 
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identified. Based on the above, the study developed numerical models that quantify the possible 
performance under alternative contracting strategies.  
 
5.3.1. General Model Framework and Analysis Methods 
Many prior studies and common perception indicate that project schedule and cost are 
intercorrelated. Therefore, special consideration was given to the simultaneity of schedule and 
cost in this chapter in model development. The study assumed that model functions are linear 
with fixed coefficients and additive residuals. This assumption would be perhaps unrealistic 
considering complex nature of construction projects. However, it simplifies the estimation of 
variable’s coefficients and helps users easily understand and apply the findings. Based on this, 
this study initially set up the following equation system; 
 
  𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽𝑠 ∙ 𝑋𝑠 +  𝛾𝑠 ∙ 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝜃𝑠 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅 +  𝜏𝑠 ∙ 𝐼 +  𝜀𝑠 (3) 
  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑒 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛽𝑐 ∙ 𝑋𝑐 +  𝛾𝑐 ∙ 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝜃𝑐 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅 +  𝜏𝑐 ∙ 𝐼 +  𝜀𝑐 (4) 
 
where, 𝑋𝑐 and 𝑋𝑠 = vectors of confounding variables affecting project schedule and cost 
performance, respectively; TSCR and TCCR = the ratio of total change order amounts and days 
over original contract amounts and days, respectively; I = indicator variable for contracting 
strategies; and 𝜀s = error terms.  
Although the above two equations do not include direct interactions, they will have 
correlated error terms since cost overruns and schedule delays may be attributed to the same or 
similar project risks, also meaning that the same risks or changes may influence both cost 
overruns and schedule delays of the project. Efficient parameter estimates of this equation 
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system can be accomplished by considering the synchronical correlation of error terms. 
Considering this aspect, as suitable means for the aforementioned research purpose, the study 
chose the following three multiple linear regression analysis based techniques that enable to take 
into account the simultaneity of schedule and cost performance using three-stage least squares. 
 
5.3.2. Variables Employed in Models 
This study was primarily conducted using a large quantity of real-world construction data 
comprised of 3,007 projects completed in Florida between 2002 and 2011. Although the data 
include various factors that can influence on project performance, not all aspects of the project 
are available. Therefore, based on the data availability along with the identification of probable 
variables from the literature, the following variables were selected and included in models: 
 
Table 5.5. List of Variables Used in the Analysis 
 
Variables Abbreviation Unit Measurements 
Performance 
(Dependent) 
Schedule 
Performance Ratio  
SPR % (Actual days – original contract days) / 
original contract days 
 Cost Performance 
Ratio 
CPR % (Actual amounts – original contract 
amounts) / original contract amounts 
Project Amount per Day ApD $mil
. 
Original contract amounts / original 
contract days 
 Duration –  
Long 
DurL - 1 if duration is the 3rd quartile (long 25%), 
0 otherwise 
 Duration - 
Medium 
DurM - 1 if duration is between 1st quartile and 3rd 
quartiles (medium 50%), 0 otherwise 
DOT’s 
Estimate 
DOT Estimate to 
Original Contract 
Amounts 
EOCA % DOT’s initial estimate / original contract 
amounts 
Contingency Contingency 
Difference to DOT 
Estimate 
CDE % (Contingency amounts – maximum 
contingency amounts in policy) / DOT’s 
initial estimate 
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Table 5.5. List of Variables Used in the Analysis (continued) 
 
Variables Abbreviation Unit Measurements 
Contracting 
Strategies 
A+B ContAB - 1 if contracting strategy is A+B, 0 
otherwise 
 No Excuse Bonus ContBN - 1 if contracting strategy is no excuse 
bonus, 0 otherwise 
 Incentive/ 
Disincentive 
ContID - 1 if contracting strategy is 
incentive/disincentive, 0 otherwise 
 Lump Sum ContLS - 1 if contracting strategy is lump sum, 0 
otherwise 
Letting Amount Percent to 
Total Annual 
Letting Amounts 
PercALA % Original contract amounts / total annual 
letting amounts 
 Concurrent 
Monthly Letting 
Amounts 
ConcMLA $bil. Total letting amounts in the same month 
Bidding Bidding to 
Original Amounts  
BOA % Winning bidding amounts / original 
contract amounts 
 Number of 
Bidding 
NB # Total number of biddings tendered to the 
project 
Contractor Major Contractor Maj - 1 if the awarded contractor is ranked in 
top 30, 0 otherwise 
Economic 
Environment 
Economic 
Recession 
Rec - 1 if letting year is 2008 or later, 0 
otherwise 
Change 
Order 
Total Schedule 
Change Order 
Ratio  
TSCR % Total schedule change order amounts / 
original contract amounts 
 Total Cost Change 
Order Ratio 
TCCR % Total cost change order amounts / original 
contract days 
 Change Order 
Frequency 
Freq # Total number of change orders 
 
5.3.3. Hypothetical Model 
As aforementioned, the primary purposes of this chapter are twofold: 1) quantifying the 
performance impacts of alternative contracting strategies and 2) taking into account the 
simultaneity of schedule and cost performance. On the basis of these research objectives and 
identified variables, the study developed the hypothetical model, as illustrated in figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.3. Hypothetical Model for Schedule and Cost Performance under Contracting 
Strategies 
 
 
The primary focus of this chapter is the effectiveness of alternative contracting strategies 
with consideration of the simultaneity in schedule and cost. The hypothetical model in figure 5.3 
illustrates the conceptual interdependency between schedule and cost performance. For the 
impacts of alternative contracting strategies, most of them have been applied with the intention 
to accelerate the project completion and/or reduce project cost. In this sense, the study initially 
assumed that A+B, no excuse bonus, and I/D would have less schedule delays and cost overruns 
than the conventional approaches. Given its natures, lump sum projects generally have relatively 
simple work scopes and low project complexity. Therefore, there would be also a lower 
probability of schedule and cost growths than the conventional approach. With respect to change 
order impacts, the study expected that the magnitude and frequency of change orders, which are 
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TSCR, TCCR, and Freq would have positive relationships with schedule and cost performance 
of the project. 
The study also included various project internal and external factors into the model, 
which may affect project performance.  In the literature, project size and duration are considered 
as significantly influential variables on project performance. It is commonly reported that the 
larger and longer the project is, the more schedule delays and cost overruns. Therefore, the study 
hypothesized that they had the same positive relationships with the dependent variables. DOT’s 
estimate and contingency would be implicit parameters indicating the FDOT’s risk anticipation 
toward project risks. If they forecasted high uncertainties in the project, they might estimate 
more cost amounts and contingency to cope with possible unexpected changes during the project 
implementation.  
Contractors’ bidding behavior may be also influenced by annual or monthly letting 
allotments. For instance, when the project accounts for significant amounts in annual letting 
allotments, the following competition among contractors may become keen. This might spur 
contractors’ abnormally low tenders and consequently lead to schedule delays and cost overruns. 
On the other hand, if there are huge amounts of concurrent lettings in the same month, the 
bidding would be less competitive and bidding amounts would be reasonable. In the same 
context, high competition, which can be measured by the number of biddings, would have 
positive relationships with schedule and cost increases. Similar to the DOT’s estimate, awarded 
bidders’ bidding amounts may serve as a parameter that represents contractors’ anticipation 
toward project uncertainties. The study presumed that higher bidding amounts would be 
positively associated with schedule and cost growths.  
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Even for the same project, project performance can vary depending on the expertise and 
capabilities of the contractor. Major contractors are usually believed to have better project 
implementation abilities due to their accumulated work experiences, available resources, and 
organizational competence (DeHoog 1990). To take this aspect into account, an indicator 
variable for major contractors was also included, expecting to be negatively associated with 
project schedule and cost growths. Finally, the research period in this study is over the 10-year 
span between 2002 and 2011. During that time span, there was the significant economic 
recession since 2008. Since external economic environments may have influence on project 
performance, the study used an indicator variable for the economic recession. It is anticipated 
that because contractors would maintain highly intensive management efforts to survive during 
the economic recession, project performance would be better than under the ordinary economic 
settings.  
 
5.3.4. Research Methods 
One of the major concerns in this chapter is the simultaneity in project schedule and cost. The 
schedule performance equation (3) and the cost performance equation (4) served as the 
simultaneous equations of this chapter. Although the study assumed the linearity between 
dependent and independent variables, separate estimation of coefficients for the two 
simultaneous equations by equation-by-equation ordinary least squares would have some major 
limitations. Schedule and cost performance are endogenously determined under the interrelated 
structural system. However, the coefficients estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) will not 
efficiently reflect these simultaneous relationships. As a consequence, the coefficients will be 
biased and inconsistent (Bhargava et al. 2010). As statistical analysis techniques to take into 
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account the simultaneity and overcome the limitations of the traditional OLS approach, three-
stage least squares (3SLS), two-stage least squares (2SLS), and seemingly unrelated regression 
estimations (SURE) are widely used across various research domains. However, it is known that 
estimation results of SURE are efficient but not identified and the 2SLS estimation results are 
identified but not efficient (Lin 2005). Therefore, to yield unbiased and efficient estimates, the 
study employed 3SLS and compared its results with those of OLS. 
   
5.4. Analysis Results and Discussions 
 
On the basis of the hypothetical model, statistical analyses were conducted. Prior to performing 
the intended 3SLS analysis, the study examined the endogeneity of the schedule and cost 
performance variables, as presented in table 5.6. The 3SLS analysis was conducted and 
significant coefficients were estimated, as shown in table 5.6. Surprisingly, signs of some 
coefficients in the models indicated contradictory implications against common perceptions. The 
detailed explanations were addressed in the following section. 
 
5.4.1. Existence of Endogeneity 
The study assumed the probability of simultaneity between schedule delays and cost overruns in 
the project. Given this assumption, it must be tested whether the variables of schedule and cost 
performance ratios are endogenous, which means there exists the simultaneity between them. As 
a means to test endogeneity, Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square test was done. If p-values of the 
test are not smaller than an intended statistical significance level, the study cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that schedule delays and cost overruns are exogenous. As assumed, the test results 
 88 
 
provided the significant evidences that the endogeneity presence of schedule delays in cost 
overruns equation and vice versa, as indicated in table 5.6. This implies that OLS can result in 
biased and inefficient estimation of the simultaneous equations. To this end, the 3SLS analysis 
was employed to circumvent the limitations of OLS. The study used schedule performance ratio 
and cost performance ratio as instrument variables for the cost and schedule performance 
models, respectively, to unbiasedly and efficiently estimate the parameters. 
 
Table 5.6. Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test for Endogeneity Check 
 
Null Hypothesis Chi-Square p-Value 
Schedule delays are exogenous 19.64 0.000 
Cost overruns are exogenous 19.75 0.000 
 
5.4.2. Analysis Results from Simultaneous Equations 
Table 5.7 provides the estimation results from 3SLS and OLS analysis drawing on schedule and 
cost performance models. For the sake of the parsimony in model estimation, the study excluded 
statistically insignificant variables by conforming a stepwise regression technique with backward 
elimination procedure. The system weighted R-squared values that indicate the goodness of fit of 
the simultaneous equation models showed that 56.8 and 52.9 percent of the data variation was 
explained by the included independent variables in the schedule and cost performance models, 
respectively. Therefore, it can be concluded that the variables in the models may be the major 
factors affecting project performance, whereas there still may be additional factors beyond the 
scope of this study to make the model more comprehensive. With respect to model comparison 
between 3SLS and OLS, there was no significant difference between two methods in their 
system weighted R-squared values. Nevertheless, based on the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test results, 
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it should be noted that OLS had limitations in unbiased and effective estimations. In addition, as 
a means to compare the performance of the two methods, the study examined the root mean 
square error (RMSE). The RMSE was estimated using the following equation: 
Root Mean Square Error =  √
1
𝑛 − 1
∑(?̂?𝑖 −  𝑦𝑖)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The RMSE values of 3SLS in both the schedule and cost models were slightly smaller 
than those of OLS (0.1622 and 0.0540 in 3SLS versus 0.1636 and 0.0542 in OLS, respectively). 
Therefore, it could be concluded that the simultaneous equation models (3SLS) were relatively 
better than the single equation models (OLS). 
The results from both 3SLS and OLS indicated that there exist the positive relationships 
between project schedule and cost performance. In particular, the two instrument variables were 
found to be statistically significant: that is, cost performance ratio in the schedule performance 
model at a 90 percent significant level, and schedule performance ratio in the cost performance 
model at a 99 percent significant level. However, cost performance ratio in OLS was not 
significant in the schedule performance model. This would affirm that OLS cannot efficiently 
estimate the latent simultaneity between the two dependent variables.   
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Table 5.7. Analysis Results of Performance Models 
 
  Schedule Performance Cost Performance 
Variable 3SLS OLS 3SLS OLS 
Constant 0.1571*** 0.1555*** -0.0166* -0.0127 
(8.88) (8.69) (-1.67) (-1.25) 
Schedule Performance Ratio   0.0649*** 0.0304*** 
   (4.29) (2.98) 
Cost Performance Ratio 0.2472* 0.1164   
(1.81) (1.24)   
Amount per Day  
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
4.0215*** 4.0181*** -0.7272** -0.5369* 
(5.22) (5.17) (-2.55) (-1.92) 
Duration - Long  
(1 if duration is long 25%, 0 otherwise) 
-0.0732*** -0.0716*** 0.0375*** 0.0336*** 
(-3.83) (-3.72) (3.98) (3.51) 
Duration - Medium  
(1 if duration is mid 50%, 0 otherwise) 
  0.0237*** 0.0236*** 
  (3.32) (3.20) 
DOT Estimate to Original Amount Ratio   0.0333*** 0.0315*** 
  (3.34) (3.04) 
Contingency Difference to DOT 
Estimation Ratio 
  0.8814* 0.8073* 
  (1.93) (1.70) 
Contracting – A+B  
(1 if A+B, 0 otherwise) 
  0.0295*** 0.0285*** 
  (2.77) (2.62) 
Contracting – No Excuse Bonus  
(1 if no excuse bonus, 0 otherwise) 
-0.1664*** -0.1597***   
(-5.73) (-5.30)   
Contracting - I/D  
(1 if incentive/disincentive, 0 otherwise) 
-0.1527*** -0.1489***   
(-6.82) (-6.41)   
Contracting – Lump Sum 
(1 if lump sum, 0 otherwise) 
  0.0181*** 0.0187*** 
  (3.48) (3.48) 
Amount Percent to Annual Lettings -6.6313*** -6.6703*** 1.7237*** 1.2690** 
(-4.16) (-4.15) (2.92) (2.21) 
Concurrent Monthly Letting Amount 
(in billions of U.S. dollars) 
-0.1831*** -0.1866*** -0.0467* -0.0507* 
(-2.65) (-2.68) (-1.73) (-1.85) 
Bidding to Original Amount Ratio -0.7020*** -0.6668***   
(-5.76) (-5.34)   
Major Contractor  
(1 if contractor is top 30, 0 otherwise) 
-0.0460*** -0.0447*** 0.0109** 0.0095* 
(-2.93) (-2.83) (2.06) (1.80) 
Economic Recession  
(1 if letting year is after 2008, 0 otherwise) 
  -0.0340*** -0.0333*** 
  (-5.44) (-5.15) 
Total Schedule Change Order Ratio 1.1276*** 1.1649***   
(18.45) (19.90)   
Total Cost Change Order Ratio   0.9413*** 0.985*** 
  (19.26) (20.83) 
Number of Change Order 0.0044*** 0.0044*** -0.0005* -0.0002 
(6.11) (6.12) (-1.86) (-0.98)    
  
N 594 594 594 594 
RMSE 0.1622 0.1636 0.0540 0.0542  
System Weighted R2 0.5684  0.5700  0.5285  0.5377  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(t statistics in parentheses) 
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5.4.3. Impacts of Contracting Strategies and Project Attributes 
This study then examined the performance impacts of project inherent characteristics by using 
the two parameters of project size and duration. Intriguingly, the project size variable and 
duration indicators had opposite effects on schedule and cost. In the schedule performance 
model, amount per day, which was original contract amounts divided by original contract days, 
had the positive estimate sign to the project schedule. Of the project duration indicators, only the 
projects with the 25 percent longest duration were found to be statistically significant. The 
negative sign of the variable estimate indicated that those projects experienced less schedule 
delays. Conversely, the project size and duration related factors revealed opposite aspects in the 
cost performance model. The project duration indicator variables showed gradually positive 
impacts on project cost. That is, there was a tendency that the longer project duration was, the 
more cost overruns would occur. However, projects with more amounts experienced less cost 
growths. These conflicting results would indicate that there may exist interactive effects, or 
trade-offs, of project characteristics on project schedule and cost variances. 
Other notable factors were the FDOT’s estimate and contingency-related variables. They 
can serve as indicators measuring the risk anticipation level of the owner toward the specific 
project. It was seen that they had positive relationships with project cost growths, meaning that 
the owner appropriately anticipated the uncertainties of the project to the extent. However, those 
variables had no effect on project schedule. This might suggest the needs for additional 
consideration of schedule contingency in the planning stage for project amounts and 
contingency, to cope with the possible schedule variances. 
With respect to the effectiveness of alternative contracting strategies, which is one of the 
major concerns in this chapter, it is noteworthy that A+B and lump sum approaches had no 
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significant impacts on project schedule, while having significantly positive effects on project 
cost growths. On the other hand, no excuse bonus and I/D had no significant effects on project 
cost, whilst negatively affecting project schedule. This implies that 1) A+B did not satisfy its 
intended purposes for either the acceleration of project delivery or cost savings, 2) no excuse 
bonus and I/D were effective in restraining schedule delays but had no cost reduction effects, and 
3) despite its relatively simple work scopes, lump sum projects experienced more cost overruns.  
 
5.4.4. Effects of Project Internal and External Factors 
The study also included letting related variables in order to investigate the impacts of bidding 
competition and contractors’ project risk anticipation. Given the nature of open procurement 
processes offered by the public agency, the letting schedule and information must be announced 
at least 90 days before the bidding date. Therefore, it is likely that contractors would be 
influenced by the annual or monthly letting schedule. If the project accounted for a large part of 
the total annual letting budget, there would be the high degree of competition and bidding 
amounts would be subsequently low. In this case, awarded contractors might exceed the original 
contract amounts and/or days. On the other hand, in the case that there were more opportunities 
to win projects, contractors’ competition would be alleviated and place appropriate bids, having 
the lower probability of schedule delays and/or cost overruns. The coefficient signs of concurrent 
monthly letting amount supported these assumptions. It was seen that the more letting amounts 
in the same letting month, the less project schedule and cost increase. However, the project’s 
proportion to total annual letting amounts had a positive relationship with project cost but a 
negative impact on project schedule. This could be attributed to the fact that this sort of huge-
scaled projects had substantial impacts on the traveling public and adjunct communities and 
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business. Therefore, shortening project duration would be prioritized at the expense of more cost 
investments. Awarded contractors’ bidding amounts would be a parameter to analogize their risk 
anticipation. If the contractor forecasted higher uncertainties in the given project, bidding 
amounts would be larger than original contract amounts, having more schedule delays and/or 
cost overruns. However, the variable of bidding to original amount ratio did not have an impact 
on project cost. Rather, it had a negative relationship with project schedule. This might be due to 
that contractors made bidding decisions based on other factors, not the project’s own risks.  
The contractor’s expertise and available resources may also directly differentiate project 
performance. It is commonly perceived that major contractors may manage the project more 
efficiently, thereby having less project variances. This perception was supported from the 
estimation results in the schedule performance model. However, major contractors experienced 
more cost overruns. This would be that major contractors usually construct larger projects that 
duration reduction would be more important. In addition to the constructor variable, external 
economic environments may influence project performance. To that end, this study employed the 
economic indicator variable representing the economic recession in 2008. The corresponding 
estimation results indicated that the degree of cost overruns slackened after the recession, whilst 
having no impact on project schedule. 
Change orders are considered as a main culprit of project schedule and cost increases. 
They can cause schedule delays and cost overruns separately or simultaneously  However, the 
results revealed that total cost change order ratio, which is the ratio of total cost changes caused 
by change orders to original contract amounts, was not associated with project schedule, while 
having a positive impact on project cost growths. On the other hand, total schedule change order 
ratio showed an opposite aspects. While not having an impact on project cost, it was positively 
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related to only project schedule changes. Strikingly, the frequency of change order occurrence, 
the number of change order variable, had a contradictory impact on project cost performance. As 
expected, it had the positive sign to project schedule yet showed the negative sign to project cost. 
To investigate the causes of these conflicting results, the study examined the distribution of 
change order reasons. It was found that approximately 70 percent of change orders accounted for 
schedule extension, whereas cost related change orders were only 25 percent with the less 
fluctuation of cost variances. Therefore, after the effect isolation by other explanatory variables, 
the net impact of the frequency of change orders variables would be negative to project cost.  
  
 
5.5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The results from the comparative analysis and simultaneous equation models in this chapter 
partially lent credence to the previous studies’ results that alternative contracting strategies were 
effective. However, their detailed effectiveness revealed some conflicting aspects. Particularly, 
A+B seems to be the worst contracting methods due to its poor performance in both schedule and 
cost. No excuse bonus and I/D provisions were effective in restraining the possible schedule 
delays as their intention for the project delivery acceleration. Intriguingly, although lump sum 
projects usually had relatively simple work scopes and, consequently, less possibility of 
performance variances, they experienced more cost overruns. Another focus of this chapter was 
the simultaneity in schedule and cost. Based on the results from the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
and the 3SLS estimation, the existence of the simultaneity was significantly evidenced. To this 
end, it could be concluded that performance quantification frameworks should take into account 
the simultaneous relationships between project schedule and cost.  This chapter also examined 
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the performance impacts of various project inherent, related, and external variables. While some 
factors reaffirmed the previous studies’ findings and common perception, the other variables 
opposite impacts on schedule and cost. This indicated that those factors may cause the tradeoff 
impacts on schedule and cost. 
 
  
 96 
 
6. INTEGRATED CONTINGENCY ADJUSTMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
On the basis of the research results on the effectiveness of alternative contracting strategies and 
the impacts of the factors in the previous chapter, the study developed a contingency adjustment 
framework. The proposed framework based on the path model is unique and significant because 
it can take into account not only the performance impacts of contracting strategies but also 
sequential effects of project factors in accordance with their project phases. Through the 
analysis, the study produced a summary table for the recommended contingency adjustment rates 
corresponding to given project conditions.  
 
6.1. Need for Contingency Adjustment 
 
Given the uncertain nature of construction, estimating and managing contingency are challenging 
and inherently involve a lack of accuracy. Particularly, current contingency practice usually 
apply the traditional fixed rate approach (Bakhshi and Touran 2014). Even worse, some agencies 
do not weigh the intrinsic natures of the project in their contingency allocation. A telling 
example that represents the failure in accurate contingency estimation is seen in projects 
analyzed in this study, as illustrated in Figure 3.10. In this sense, numerous prior studies have 
discussed methods for more accurate contingency estimating (Baccarini 2006; Bakhshi and 
Touran 2009; Bakhshi and Touran 2014; Chan et al. 2009; Chen and Hartman 2000; Choi et al. 
2004; Paek et al. 1993; Sachs and Tiong 2009; Smith and Bohn 1999; Touran 2003; Touran 
2006; Touran and Lopez 2006). Although their innovative approaches, such as probabilistic and 
modern mathematical methods, proved their intended performance, they usually require 
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substantial amounts of cost and time to implement (Bakhshi and Touran 2014). Therefore, more 
practical contingency estimating methods need to be devised to better benefit practitioners in the 
roadway construction industry. In addition, the literature implies that no effort has been made to 
investigate sequential influences of project factors based on factor’s construction phase in 
contingency estimation.  
On the basis of the identification of issues in current contingency practice and research, 
the study devised a comprehensive and intuitive framework to better estimate contingency 
adjustment over the fixed contingency rate in the owner’s policy.  
 
6.2. Model Development for Contingency Adjustment  
 
Construction activities, in general, can be classified by their sequential stages from planning, 
through bidding and procurement, to construction and completion. Each activity can serve as 
either a causal or affected factor to the other depending on its position in sequential processes of 
construction. Furthermore, their impacts may also be either direct or indirect: in other words, 
some factor may serve as a mediator between two different factors. The study assumed that 
precedent construction factors may directly and indirectly influence subsequent factors in the 
later construction stages. Through these pathwise relationships based on construction procedural 
stages, the accurate contingency amounts can be estimated.  
An analytical means to reflect pathwise causal relationships is path analysis. Path 
analysis is a member of structural equation modeling (SEM) and can be consisted of two or more 
causal-effect regression models (Garson 2013). It has a distinctive advantage in visualizing 
complex causal and/or interrelated relationships of factors through a path diagram and providing 
direct and indirect impacts of factors (Garson 2013; Hair et al. 2006; Kim et al. 2009; Yuan et al. 
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2018). Based on the objective of this chapter and the principles of path analysis, this study 
established the hypothetical path model that can accurately quantify the contingency adjustment 
rate, as depicted in figure 6.1. This study assumed that the available information in the current 
construction phase directly influenced factors in the subsequent construction stage, eventually, 
directly and/or indirectly affecting the level of contingency adjustment rate that are essential to 
cope with project cost variances. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Hypothetical Path Model for Contingency Adjustment Rate 
 
 
 
6.3. Analysis Results and Discussions 
 
On the basis of the developed hypothetical path model, the study conducted the corresponding 
path analysis. By employing the stepwise backward technique, the study carefully examined the 
statistical significances of variables and excluded insignificant ones step wisely. The final path 
model results were provided in tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 and figure 6.2.  
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Figure 6.2. Path Model for Contingency Adjustment Rate 
 
 
6.3.1. Model Fit of Path Model 
Prior to investigating the effects of the variables included in the model, the study examined the 
goodness of fit of the proposed path model. It is recommended to consider multiple model fit 
indices when analyzing a path model (Marsh et al. 1996). The study examined the indices of chi-
square/degree of freedom, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), root mean square 
residual (RMR), comparative fit index (CFI), and Tucke-Lewis (TLI). Table 6.1 provides model 
fit indices, recommended benchmarks, and measured values. Since all index values fell into the 
ranges of recommended benchmarks, it can be concluded that the model has a good fit in general 
(Browne and Cudeck 1989; Schreiber et al. 2006; Wang et al. 1996). This also indicates that all 
relationships of the variables in the model were significant.  
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Table 6.1. Model Fit Indices and Recommended Benchmarks 
 
 Fit Index Recommended Benchmarks Value 
Chi-square / Degree of Freedom 1 ≤ Chi2 /DF ≤ 5; Lower value is better 2.248 
Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
Good if RMSEA ≤ 0.05; Acceptable if RMSEA ≤ 0.1 0.045 
Root Mean Squared Residual 
(RMR) 
Perfect fit if 0; Smaller value is better 0.026 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) Acceptable if CFI ≥ 0.9 0.967 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) Acceptable if TLI ≥ 0.9 0.932 
 
 
The study applied the stepwise backward approach to obtain an optimized path model. 
Therefore, insignificant factors were excluded through this procedure. Figure 6.3 displays the 
entire pathways of the variables in the final path model. The solid lines indicate the positive 
relationships, while the dash lines reveal the negative relationships. Table 6.2 provides the 
standardized and unstandardized coefficients in individual path equations. In general, all 
variables’ relationships were statistically significant at more than a 90 percent significant level. 
Moreover, the R-squared values of individual path equations ranged 8.46 to 49.78 and the overall 
path model’s R-squared was 94.27.  
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Table 6.2. Result Summary of Individual Path Equation 
 
 
Variable 
Bidding & Contract Construction Contingency 
CDO BOA NB SDBA Maj TSCR TCCR Freq CAdj 
Planning ApD -0.1091*** 
 
-44.4786*** -2.3442*** 8.9011*** 
 
-0.5946** 
  
 -(0.1369)  -(0.2831) -(0.2622) (0.2535)  -(0.1436)   
DurL -0.0078*** -0.0447*** 0.5144*** -0.0968*** 
 
0.0274*** 0.0241*** 16.5398*** 0.0671*** 
 -(0.3620) -(0.3798) (0.1179) -(0.3899)  (0.1560) (0.2097) (0.5191) (0.3610) 
DurM -0.0094*** -0.0294*** 
 
-0.0909*** 0.1142*** 0.0183*** 0.0156** 3.9176*** 0.0334*** 
 -(0.4584) -(0.2707)  -(0.3967) (0.1269) (0.1128) (0.1472) (0.1332) (0.1947) 
EstOrgA 0.0184*** 0.0322*** 2.3314*** 0.1246*** 
 
-0.0246** 
 
-3.3757** 0.0258** 
 (0.4316) (0.1420) (0.2771) (0.2604)  -(0.0726)  -(0.0550) (0.0720) 
Cont_AB 
 
0.1703*** 0.7871** 0.0387* 
   
7.8617*** 
 
  (0.6681) (0.0833) (0.0719)    (0.1140)  
Cont_BN 
 
0.0220*** 0.6175*** 
    
4.4088*** -0.0229** 
  (0.1003) (0.0761)     (0.0744) -(0.0661) 
Cont_ID 
  
1.2406 
 
-0.1268** -0.0239** 
   
   (0.1879)  -(0.0860) -(0.0901)    
Cont_LS 0.0024*** 0.0080** -0.3232** 0.0248*** 
    
0.0246*** 
 (0.1105) (0.0689) -(0.0755) (0.1018)     (0.1349) 
PerALA 
 
0.5313** 34.7178** 1.9846** 
  
0.8953* 898.2503*** 1.4193*** 
  (0.0655) (0.1156) (0.1161)   (0.1131) (0.4095) (0.1109) 
Rec 
  
1.0767*** -0.0272*** 
  
-0.0122*** 
 
-0.0372*** 
   (0.2585) -(0.1148)   -(0.1111)  -(0.2095) 
Bidding & 
Contract 
CDO 
         
BOA 
     
0.2462*** 0.0964** 
  
      (0.1651) (0.0987)   
NB 
     
-0.0032** 
 
0.5525*** 
 
      -(0.0802)  (0.0757)  
SDBA 
         
Maj 
      
0.0078* 
 
0.0129** 
       (0.0661)  (0.0675) 
Construction TSCR 
        
0.2042*** 
         (0.1929) 
TCCR 
        
0.6103*** 
         (0.3775) 
Freq 
         
Contingency CAdj 
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Table 6.2. Result Summary of Individual Path Equation (continued) 
 
Variable 
Bidding & Contract Construction Contingency 
CDO BOA NB SDBA Maj TSCR TCCR Freq CAdj 
Constant 0.0088*** 0.0524*** 3.6798*** 0.2135*** 0.5198*** 0.0278** 0.0005 0.7156 -0.0750*** 
(0.8652) (0.9705) (1.8408) (1.8765) (1.1635) (0.3457) (0.0099) (0.0490) -(0.8803) 
Error Term 0.0001 0.0015 2.6963 0.0096 0.1827 0.0061 0.0026 82.3295 0.0043 
(0.5814) (0.5022) (0.6747) (0.7414) (0.9154) (0.9441) (0.9531) (0.3863) (0.5954) 
           
Covariance 
  
0.0143**   0.0010*** 0.0646*** 
  
  
(0.0891) 
 
  (0.2399) 
 
(0.1384) 
  
     
 0.1722*** (TSCR & Freq) 
     
 (0.2427) 
 
  
Chi-Squared 137.13 (p=0.000) 
       
R-squared (Individual) 0.4186 0.4978 0.3253 0.2586 0.0846 0.0559 0.0469 0.6137 0.4046 
R-squared (Overall) 0.9427         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(Standardized coefficient values in parentheses) 
 
6.3.2. Path Analysis Results - Bidding and Contract 
As factors available in the planning phase, the study included the variables of project size, 
duration, contracting strategies, estimate to the original contract amount, letting information, and 
economic recession. With respect to their relationships with the variables in the subsequent 
bidding and contract stage, contingency difference to original contract amounts (CDO) were 
negatively influenced by amount per day (ApD), project duration indicators (DurL and DurM), 
and estimate to original amounts (EOCA), whereas lump sum contracting (Cont_LS) had a 
positive impact. This indicates that the owner assigned lower contingency than their maximum 
contingency amounts for projects with larger amounts and longer duration. The possible reason 
for this tendency would be the belief that huge-scaled and long-span projects may have more 
rooms for absorbing performance variances. However, considering that the impacts of those 
variables on the contingency adjustment rate variable, this inappropriate contingency practice 
needs to be adjusted. It was found that alternative contracting strategies for delivery acceleration, 
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i.e., A+B, no excuse bonus, and I/D had no significant relationships with the owner’s 
contingency. These contracting strategies have a contractual structure that the partial risks of 
performance variances are transferred to the contractor. Therefore, it was likely that the owner 
did not take them into account when assigning consistency. Meanwhile, lump sum was positively 
associated with the owner’s contingency differences. Along with its positive relationship with 
the contingency adjustment rate, it seems that the owner appropriately anticipated the possible 
cost overrun risks of lump sum approach. However, it should be noted that CDO was not related 
to any further factors. This clearly evidences that the contingency practice did not adequately 
reflect the project risks. 
The next factor considered in the bidding and contract stage was winning bidder’s 
amounts to original contract amounts (BOA), which represents the contractor’s risk anticipation 
level. The coefficients’ signs indicates that the contractor’s bidding amounts had a proportional 
relationship with the cost-related information, i.e., estimate to original contract amounts 
(EstOrgA) and amount percent to annual letting amounts (PerALA). Conversely, project duration 
was disproportionally associated with BOA. This may portray that the contractor may have a 
tacit scheme of time-cost tradeoff. For instance, the contractor is likely to increase bidding 
amounts along with project size, while they may attempt to obtain profit by shortening the 
duration. With respect to contracting strategies’ effects, all but I/D had significant positive 
relationships with BOA. As aforementioned, because alternative contracting strategies 
structurally transfer the project risks to the contractor, some risk premium would be added. 
It is highly likely that information in the planning phase stimulates the degree of bidding 
competition. In this sense, number of bidding (NB) was also included and examined. For the 
negative coefficient sign of ApM, project size increase may act as an entry barrier for small-mid 
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sized contractors, thereby having less competition. However, in the case that the project 
accounted for a large amount of total annual letting, PerALA, the project would attract 
contractors’ attention or there would be a limited number of other lettings. Therefore, the 
competition would be ignited. EstOrgA is the variance between the owner’s estimate and 
contracted, or negotiated, amounts. This may mean the project had more variance in project risk 
anticipation among bidding participants. Subsequently, more contractors would place a bid. 
Concerning alternative contracting strategies, A+B, no excuse bonus, and I/D gathered more 
biddings, whereas lump sum had less. The former may have an opportunity to gain additional 
profit due to their compensational nature, yet lump sum is unit price so that may have no 
additional chance for profit. This would cause the difference in the level of bidding competition. 
With respect to the impact of external economic environments, it is clearly seen that the 
economic recession (Rec) increased the competition. 
The study expected that the standard deviation of bidding amounts (SDBA) variable 
would serve as a parameter representing the degree of risk perception disparity among bidders. 
However, the increases in project size and duration were negatively related to SDBA. This may 
indicate that contractors’ bidding behavior was irrelative of project risks. Rather, considering the 
impacts of the other variables, contractors tend to make a bidding decision based on other factors 
beyond the scope of this study. To take an example, they might decide bidding amounts 
according to the surrounding situation: specifically, with an opportunistic intention based on the 
market circumstances and competitors’ behavior. This conjecture could be supported by the 
impact of the Rec variable. Because the construction industry is highly subject to economic 
fluctuation, contractors may bid their possible lowest prices without an opportunistic intention to 
survive during the economic recession, consequently, having less bidding amount deviation 
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among bidders. SDBA was surely positively correlated to NB, which means the more bidders, 
the more deviation in bidding amounts. It is notable that SDBA had no further relationship to the 
next construction phase variables. This means that the degree of contractors’ bidding amount 
variances did not necessarily reflect their differences in project risk anticipation.  
Finally, the characteristic of awarded contactors (Maj) was considered in the bidding and 
contract phase. ApM can act as an entry barrier so that major contractors were awarded more 
contacts. In projects with duration between short 25 and long 25 percent (DurM), major 
contractors became distinguished, while they were less successful in I/D projects. The R-squared 
value of this individual was only 8.46 percent. Therefore, the success or failure of major 
contractors in contract awarding needs more compounding variables beyond this study.  
 
6.3.3. Path Analysis Results - Construction 
Once bidding and contract procedures are done, the project will be under construction and 
encounter with unexpected changes: namely, change orders involving schedule and cost 
variances. Since construction projects are inherently uncertain, change orders are inevitable 
regardless of project characteristics. In this section, the study examined the impacts of the 
variable in the previous phase on the change order variables in the construction stage.  
As a measurement of schedule related change orders in the given project, total schedule 
change order ratio (TSCR) was used. The two duration indicators (DurL and DurM) were 
directly and positively associated with TSCR. However, with respect to the owner’s estimate 
(EstOrgaA) and awarded contractor’s bidding amounts (BOA), their relational aspects to TSCR 
were diagonally opposite. Whereas bidding amounts had a positive relationship, owner estimate 
was negatively associated with TSCR. These conflicting results may represent the both parties’ 
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different standpoints toward schedule change order. From the contractor side, they would 
recognize monetary value of project time and, consequently, reflect the possible schedule 
changes in project cost estimation. However, the owner would be less subject to schedule 
changes because the primary responsibility would be on the contractor. As for impacts of 
contracting strategies, A+B, no excuse bonus, and lump sum were significant but I/D showed a 
negative relationship with TSCR. This reaffirms the findings of the previous chapter and sections 
that I/D was effective in suppressing schedule growths. It was seen that NB was negatively 
associated with TSCR. This would imply that bidding competition play a role in restraining 
schedule change order.  
Subsequent to schedule change order, the study also examined total cost change order 
ratio (TCCR). The duration indicators (DurL and DurM) clearly showed their adverse impacts on 
TCCR. However, cost related variables  – ApD, PerALA, and BOA – had different relationships 
with TCCR. Project size (ApM) was negatively associated with cost change order, while the 
project’s proportion in total annual letting amounts (PerALA) and awarded contractor’s bidding 
amounts (BOA) had a positive relationship. With regard to project size, huge-scaled projects 
would have substantial impacts on project participants, surrounding communities, and traveling 
public. Therefore, there would be more managerial attention from both the owner and contractor, 
resulting in less cost change order. Yet, the project’s proportion in total annual amounts may also 
account for the number of available lettings, which would be also related to an awarding 
possibility of the contractor. Therefore, the contractor might bid abnormally low amounts and 
attempt to recoup the loss by occurring more cost change order. By the same token, if the 
contractor placed higher bidding amounts than original contract amounts, he/she might also try to 
meet his/her intended benefit with more cost change order.. However, the negative coefficient 
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sign of the economic recession (Rec) may indicate that the contractor refrained from those 
attempts for the survival under the economic hardship. The contractor attribute indicator Maj 
implies that major contractors had more cost change order. This would be attributed to the fact 
that they usually construct huge-scaled projects with high uncertainties. From the covariance 
matrix, it was also found that TSCR and TCCR were positively correlated so that they would 
have a simultaneous relationship. 
Finally, the frequency of change order (Freq) was considered in the construction stage. 
The results indicate that project size did not have an impact on Freq, whereas projects with long 
duration experienced more frequent change orders. One interesting relationship in this individual 
path equation was the impact of EstOrgA. The negative sign may indicate that the owner’s 
estimate did not adequately take the possible change order occurrence into account.  As for the 
impacts of contracting strategies, A+B and no excuse bonus experienced more frequent change 
orders. However, considering the other equations, it should be noted that this necessarily means 
they caused more schedule and cost changes. The PerALA and NB variables provided the same 
implications with those of TCCR. On the basis of their positive relationships with Freq, it is 
possible to assume that the contractor might attempt more change orders. Freq was also 
correlated with both TSCR and TCCR. Without a doubt, the more change orders there were, the 
more schedule and cost changes were accompanied. 
 
 
6.3.4. Contingency Adjustment Rate 
The primary objective of this chapter is to accurately quantify contingency adjustment rate based 
on the pathwise relationships along with the project’s sequential stages. Therefore, in the 
proposed path model, all pathway arrows were eventually gathered in the contingency 
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adjustment rate (CAdj) variable. In this section, the decomposed effects as well as the coefficient 
signs of the significant variables were discussed. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Measurement Principle of Total Effect to Dependent Variable in Path Analysis 
 
 
When interpreting a causal effect in a path analysis, the path multiplication rule should be 
applied, which is defined that the effect value of compound path is the product of its path 
coefficients (Garson 2013). For instance, as illustrated in figure 6.3, if we have a simple path 
model with three variables of independent, mediator, and dependent, the effect of the 
independent variable through the mediator to the dependent is the product of the two coefficients 
in the pathways: that is, a × b. Even when there are more pathways, the same principal can be 
applied. Under the effect decomposition rule, total effect of the independent variable can be 
decomposed into an indirect effect and a direct effect (Alwin and Hauser 1975; Garson 2013; 
Schreiber et al. 2006). The aforementioned effect is the indirect effect of the independent through 
the mediator on the dependent. The direct of the independent variable on the dependent variable 
is c. By summing the both, the total effect of a × b + c can be estimated. Following the two 
aforementioned principals, the study excerpted a part of the path model, as depicted in Figure 
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6.4, and decomposed the effects of the significant variables on the contingency adjustment rate 
variable, as provided in table 6.3. For better understanding, the study conducted the effect 
composition based on the unstandardized coefficient values. The study expects that the results in 
table 6.3 and 6.4 will serve as a contingency adjustment matrix for the owner when allocating 
contingency. 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Excerpted Path Model for Effect Decomposition 
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Table 6.3. Contingency Adjustment Rate Matrix - Effect Decomposition of Significant Variables 
 
Effect to Dependent Variable (CAdj) Effect of Variables in Path to Dependent Variable 
Variable Effect Type Effect Value Maj TSCR TCCR 
DurL Indirect 0.0203  0.0056 0.0147 
 Direct 0.0671    
  Total 0.0874    
DurM Indirect 0.0133 0.0015 0.0037 0.0095 
 Direct 0.0334    
 Total 0.0467    
EOCA Indirect -0.0050  -0.0050  
 Direct 0.0258    
  Total 0.0208    
Cont_BN Indirect 0.0000    
 Direct -0.0229    
 Total -0.0229    
Cont_LS Indirect 0.0000    
 Direct 0.0246    
  Total 0.0246    
PerALA Indirect 0.5464   0.5464 
 Direct 1.4193    
 Total 1.9657    
Rec Indirect -0.0074   -0.0074 
 Direct -0.0372    
  Total -0.0446    
Maj Indirect 0.0048   0.0048 
 Direct 0.0129    
 Total 0.0176    
TSCR Indirect 0.0000    
 Direct 0.2042    
  Total 0.2042    
TCCR Indirect 0.0000    
 Direct 0.6103    
  Total 0.6103    
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As for the project inherent characteristics, it was found that project size (ApD) was not 
statistically significant. However, from the statistical significance levels and standardized 
coefficient values of the two project duration indicators (DurL and DurM), there was a strong 
evidence that projects with long duration require more contingency allocation. This is also in line 
with the findings that project duration also had unfavorable impacts on schedule and cost change. 
The total effect values present that the project ranked in the quartiles of long 25 and medium 50 
percent may need additional contingency amounts equivalent to 8.74 and 4.67 percent of original 
contract amounts on top of the maximum contingency amounts in the policy, respectively. 
The owner estimate (EOCA), which would be an indicator of the owner’s risk 
anticipation level, coincided with the actual project cost variances, in general. However, it should 
be also noted that consideration on schedule change orders was not sufficiently taken, as 
indicated in EOCA’s indirect effect value. Based on the estimated total effect, 0.02 percent of 
original contract amounts should be added as per 1 percent increase of the owner estimate to 
original contract amounts.  
With regard to the effectiveness of alternative contracting strategies, it was shown that no 
excuse bonus (Cont_BN) provision can contribute to the reduction of contingency. That is, the 
owner would be able to deduct 2.29 percent of original contract amounts from the maximum 
contingency amounts in the policy. Meanwhile, lump sum (Cont_LS) projects may require more 
contingency assignments. The total effect value indicates that lump sum projects need additional 
2.46 percent of original contract amounts. 
The letting information also can serve as a parameter for contingency. In the case that the 
project accounts for a large part of the total annual letting amounts, the owner should take 
consideration on that information. The total effect value indicates that 1 percent increase of the 
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project in the proportion of the total annual letting amounts would require additional contingency 
amounts of 1.97 percent of original contract amounts. 
If the economic environments are in decline, the owner would be able to retrench 
contingency budgets by 4.46 percent of original contract amounts. However, the contractor is a 
major contractor, ranked within top 30, 1.76 percent of original contract amounts may be 
required.  
The magnitudes of schedule and cost change order also need consideration in assigning 
contingency. The results indicate that 0.20 and 0.61 percent of original amounts would have to 
be added per 1 percent increase in the total schedule and cost change order ratios, respectively. 
However, contrary to the other significant variables that would be available in the bidding and 
contract phase, change order related information cannot be identified before the construction 
commencement. In this case, the owner could estimate approximate values of total schedule and 
cost change order ratios using the corresponding equations in table 6.2. 
 
 
6.4. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Contingency serves as an essential monetary buffer to cope with project risks and uncertainties 
that can cause cost growths. However, current contingency practices do not meet the purpose of 
contingency. Moreover, the literature implies that it lacks a comprehensive contingency 
estimation framework that addresses the sequential aspects of the project and the effectiveness of 
alternative contracting strategies. To this end, this study developed the comprehensive path 
model that visually represent the relationships of factors along with the project life-cycle stages 
from planning, through bidding and contract, to construction and completion. On the basis of this 
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framework, the study obtained the matrix for contingency adjustment rate that can be applied as 
per the given conditions and information of the project. The matrix provides the following 
notable implications: 1) project size is not a significant factor, 2) the length of project duration 
should be reflected proportionally to contingency, 3) when the owner estimate exceeds original 
contract amounts, it could be a signal for additional contingency, 4) with no excuse bonus 
provision, contingency can be reduced yet increased with lump sum, 5) if the project accounts 
for substantial portion of the total annual letting amounts, more contingency would be required, 
6) in the economic recession, reduced contingency would be available, and 7) the project 
constructed by a major contractor may need more contingency. It is expected that the findings 
and results in this chapter will help agencies and practitioners grasp comprehensive relationships 
among factors and assist them to more accurately estimate contingency. In addition, although the 
framework presented in this chapter is only limited to rehabilitation projects in the certain singe 
agency, it can be extended to other project work types and regions.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The current U.S. highway system is severely aged and deteriorated because most of roadways 
already exceeded their intended life span. In addition, the situation has been worsened by the 
failure to meet the drastic increase in traffic demand. As a result, the rehabilitation of existing 
roadways has become a major concern of the nation on aspects of social welfare and national 
economy. However, roadway renewal can lead to other significant concomitant issues such as 
traffic delay, public inconvenience, accident, and consequent economic losses due to 
construction work zones. As a partial solution to those issues, alternative delivery method and 
contracting strategies have been employed over the last three decades. However, it is still 
controversial as to whether such alternative approaches are effective.  
To this end, the study primarily focused on the development of models that can quantify 
the effectiveness of alternative project delivery and contracting strategies. In particular, based on 
the research gaps identified through the literature review, the study has achieved the following 
three research objectives: (1) quantification of change order occurrence timing impacts under 
project delivery methods; (2) development of performance models with the simultaneity in 
project schedule and cost under alternative contracting strategies; and (3) establishment of a 
comprehensive but point-and-shoot contingency estimation framework that takes account of the 
effectiveness of alternative contracting strategies. 
The research objectives were achieved by analyzing a total of 3,007 transportation 
infrastructure improvement projects completed between 2002 and 2011 in Florida. Given the 
current roadway construction trend shift from new construction to rehabilitation, the study 
mainly focused on 1,103 rehabilitation, reconstruction, and resurfacing projects. The study 
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conducted a series of statistical analyses such as comparative analysis, multiple linear regression, 
three stage least squares, and path analysis in accordance with the corresponding research 
objectives.  
For the effectiveness of project delivery methods, it was found that alternative delivery 
approach, DB, was more effective in restraining unfavorable cost overruns as well as schedule 
delays than the traditional DBB method. The multiple linear regression analysis results indicated 
that the magnitude of change order caused more schedule and cost growths, in general. The 
timing impacts of change order occurrence on project performance were the main focus of 
interest in this analysis. Contrary to the previous studies, the later occurrence of change order 
had less impacts on project schedule. Meanwhile, although change order occurrence timing 
showed a positive relationship with cost performance, its impact was statistically negligible.   
In the chapter for the second research objective, the study examined the performance 
impacts of four alternative contracting strategies: A+B, no excuse bonus, incentive/disincentive, 
and lump sum. The results from the Kruskal-Wallis tests indicated that A+B had the highest level 
of schedule delays and cost overruns. No excuse bonus was effective in constraining schedule 
delays while having relatively high cost overruns. Incentive/disincentive appears to satisfy its 
purpose of duration reduction while showing no significant cost performance difference from the 
conventional contracting strategies. Intriguingly, lump sum showed conflicting aspects to 
expectations that it would have less schedule and cost growths due to its relatively simple work 
scope and low project risks, The consequent three-stage least square analysis provided the 
similar results and reaffirmed the previous studies’ results that there exist the simultaneity in 
schedule and cost. 
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From the above findings, the study developed a contingency adjustment framework using 
the path model and obtained the summary table for contingency adjustment recommendation 
along with given project conditions. The noteworthy findings are as the following. Contrast to 
the literature, project size was not a significant factor while project duration had significant 
impacts on the required contingency adjustment. Also, the owner estimate was positively 
associated with contingency adjustment. It was found that the no excuse bonus provision and the 
economic recession would alleviate contingency burden. Finally, projects performed by major 
contractors required more contingency allocation. 
The results and findings from this study would have important contributions to the 
existing body of knowledge since the study presented quantitative information about the 
effectiveness of alternative project delivery method and contracting strategies with the 
integration of the simultaneity in schedule and cost. Also, the contingency adjustment framework 
developed in this study is the first of its kind in visually and quantitatively representing 
sequential impacts of factors. The models also provided support for the comprehensive 
understanding about diverse factors that can affect project performance. In short, the implications 
of this study will assist decision makers and practitioners in the transportation construction 
industry to better anticipate the performance impacts of factors as well as alternative project 
delivery method and contracting strategies, improving planning and management practice 
through planning, bidding and contract, and construction phases. 
The intentions and results of the study outline the following implications for future work. 
First, the research scope in this study was only 3R projects. Further research extended to other 
project work types, i.e., new construction, bridge, capacity added, and others, will enrich the 
understanding about the performance impacts of alternative project delivery method and 
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contracting strategies, and also other factors. Second, the research area was limited in the state of 
Florida. Therefore, it would be valuable to examine the aspects of variables using nationwide or 
global level data. Third, the research ideas can be implemented using other analysis techniques to 
compare analysis results and to derive more significant findings. For instance, although this 
study considered ANN methods as a main research tool in the stage of research planning, 
multiple linear regression, three-stage least square, and path analysis were eventually selected 
because the data sample size was not sufficient to conduct ANNs. The inclusion of more 
abundant dataset obtained from multiple states or nations will enable the use of ANNs and other 
analysis methods, thereby drawing significant results. 
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